(A question to those in the know: if the engineer knew for sure the flood is coming, could he bypass the regulations and skip the brake test to get out of the flooded area before it's too late?)
Having
some(
) experience running trains I can speak to your question.
Without any warning from the RTC the only indication that we have of the track conditions ahead are signal indications, preplanned track restrictions and whatever is in our field of vision. If we're warned by the RTC that something is amiss most times they will usually only tell us to approach a certain mileage prepared to stop. Unless they've gotten a specific report from someone on the ground or another train ahead of us all they would see is an indication on their panel that the controlled block ahead of us is shown as being 'occupied' for an unknown reason, which usually happens when the water level gets above the tracks.
In some locations there are also devices that can detect high water levels and indeed there is one on the Bala sub (Richmond Hill line). This detector was located on a section of track that the train had already past(in a location that had seen previous flooding) and which of course would not have been flooded yet seeing as it went by that location without incident. Seems the flooding was so bad and occurred so fast that it flooded a section of track up river of the detector that had not previously had any high water issues before. Therefore, no such warning would have been given to the train ahead of time. If the crew had heard a high water alert being broadcast for the Bala sub on the standby channel and they are required monitor the standby channel at all times, then they would been required to stop their train immediately. In addition the RTC would also have received this alert and would have immediately contacted them to stop as well.
As for the brake test, sure they could of skipped it... That is if they wanted to get fired and possibly cause a disaster.
Last thing you want is to release the brakes and start moving only to find out latter that the brakes don't work and you can't stop the train (and yes this has happened). Then you could potentially have a far bigger disaster on your hands. There is a saying in the industry, that the rule book is
written in blood. Which is quite true since essentially every rule that is in place today is in response to a previous deficiency that had resulted in or may have resulted in a dangerous incident or as a result of an accident and or
fatality.
Now, I don't know for sure but its possible that someone in a high enough position of authority can authorize(above the dispatchers and direct superiors, we're talking
high up) a train to proceed without doing this brake test in a situation of
imminent danger. I'm aware of this having occurred once before during the G20 summit when it appeared that a mob of rioters were about to descend on Union Station. Alas I imagine Transport Canada might of had something to say about that afterwards. Nonetheless, under no circumstances can the train crew authorized themselves to skip this procedure. And without knowing the precise situation on the ground I doubt the higher ups would authorize such action either considering the possible consequences.
Besides, the process of the brake test itself
only takes about 2 minutes to complete. It's the 920ft walk back from the engine on uneven ballast for the engineer to get to the cab car that takes the longest time. Once on the cab car the engineer just has to apply a hand brake(in addition to the one the conductor applied on the engine which would have been completed while the engineer was walking to the cab car). Then the engineer will 'cut in' the brakes from the cab car and apply and release the brakes. During which the conductor must observe the application and release of the brakes or brake cylinder on the last piece of equipment. This is because you need to know that the 'brake signal' can be transmitted across the entire train. If the brake pipe is closed at any point in between the first and last car then test will not work on the last car and if they work on the last car then the signal will have been transmitted to every car. Cars can be cut out individually(not an easy process) but this is not allowed without reporting it and no more than 1 coach can be cut out for the train to operate in normal service. So as you can see there are very stringent procedures in place to assure the safe movement of trains. After completing the brake test the conductor would then release the hand brake on the engine, while the engineer releases the hand brake on the cab car. This is done while the train brakes are applied of course.
In addition to the standing brake test, the train must complete a running brake test soon after moving whenever it changes directions. It's yet another layer of safety and basically tells you that yes, the brakes can stop the train from moving. Though its hard to tell exactly how well/quickly they work since you do this test at a very slow speed because its obviously safer to double check that the brakes work when your only doing 15MPH instead of say 60. Now if a crew skipped out on doing the standing brake test and it turns out the train brakes aren't working from the cab, then running brake test will be nothing more than an effort in futility won't it?
All in all, this situation is not comparable to the G20 one I mentioned since in that case it would of required a crew member to walk all the way back to the to the tail end for the brake test meaning their departure would of been delayed by that walk plus the brake test, which would take 6-7 minutes total. While in the flooding instance the engineer obviously had to walk back to the tail end to change ends anyways so authorizing him to proceed without doing the subsequent brake test would only save about 2 minutes. And this situation likely occurred so quickly that a higher authority might not have been instantly available or a course of action might not have been prepared unlike there G20 riots - a situation that was being closely monitored at all times, all weekend long.
Back to the RH train. After completing the brake test the engineer on the cab car would of then had to contact the RTC in order to receive authorization to reverse direction in CTC as per CROR rule 573. Without being able to see the next signal, which was the case here, they would have been required to get a work authority from the RTC which would permit them to move in the other direction (or any direction for that matter). Its not easy to explain what this means, I suppose I'll try to explain it but I'm not sure if I can do so clearly.
The CTC(Centralized Traffic Control) signal system is normally only set up to give trains directional authorities. This allows for closer spacing in between trains moving in the same direction. There are basically two types of signals - Controlled signals and Intermediate signals. Controlled signals can be controlled by the RTC and are normally only located where trains can switch tracks(called crossovers). In between these controlled signals often there are Intermediate signals. The RTC has absolutely no control over these signals. Instead these signals are controlled automatically by the track circuit depending on the track occupancy and conditions in the blocks ahead of them. They are required because without them the train blocks would be too long and few trains would be able to move over one track in a given period of time. CN & CP, which for the longest time owned most of the signalize tracks(and most of the tracks overall) in this country decided to space the signals around 1.5 miles apart on their busiest lines as this was deemed to be the most optimal spacing for their trains(for passenger trains shorter spacing would have been more optimal). But at the same time they didn't need to make all the signals controlled signals because there is no need for crossovers every mile or two and they didn't want to create an overly complicated system with far more controlled points than what is required when Intermediate signals could rely track conditions to the train crews just as well(and of course its cheaper). If a following train is catching up to the train ahead of it and the signal to enter the block with the leading train is a controlled signal, the signal will be a stop and the following train cannot normally enter the block occupied by the leading train. The RTC could decided to change the route for the following train onto another track if that controlled location has crossovers. But most likely the following train will have to wait until the leading train clears the block ahead of it before it will receive a 'permissive signal' to enter that block itself. In some circumstances the RTC can allow the following train to enter the block occupied by the other train (i.e. if they are coming to 'rescue' a broken down train), but they would need a specific authority called a 'pass stop' from the RTC to do so. In the case of a following train approaching the train ahead of it where the signal is an Intermediate, it will display what is called a Restricting signal. This signal will allow the following train to enter into the block occupied by the other train without requiring any further authority by the RTC. There are certain conditions that the following train must meet in order to do so such as operating it at a speed that will enable it to stop in a short distance and a maximum overall speed of 15MPH. The following train can then continue until its right behind the leading train in the same block. As for the leading train, if the crew on that train suddenly decided that they needed to change directions and back up, like in the case of the Richmond Hill train in question, the signal system in and of itself cannot warn that train that another train has entered its block and is approaching it within the same block nor can it warn the following train that the leading train has changed directions and is now heading straight for it. I'm sure I don't have to explain any further on why this would be a very bad thing.
And that is why trains are normally only permitted to move in one direction and why they must get RTC permission or a work authority to reverse directions. The work authority can only be given in between two controlled locations, in between which there can be multiple Intermediate signals or possibly none at all. This way the RTC can make sure that there are no other trains in an area he has complete control over and guaranty that no other trains can enter into the limits(without addition authority) so as to avoid the possibility of a collision. To change directions without authority is a huge violation because of the possible consequences and absolutely no one can authorize a train crew to circumvent this rule.
Problem is that it can take some time to get a work authority. The crew first needs to contact the RTC, which in some cases can take several minutes if the RTC for that subdivision is dealing with other issue or giving out another authority already. Outside of a emergency call, the RTC handles all request on a first come first serve basis. At that point it was not yet a emergency situation since they crew had no idea yet that they had been cut off. Once establishing communication with the RTC, they will then give a specific set of instructions over the radio which
must be written down by the crew(he repeats them slowly to accommodate this). These instructions must then be repeated
exactly word for word by the crew member and acknowledged as a being correct before the authority can be granted and acted upon. Only then are they free to proceed in the opposite direction.
I hope that answers any(and all
) questions people may have had about the situation.
