By Johnny Au
Honours Bachelor of Arts with High Distinction
Department of Geography
University of Toronto
March 30, 2011
Introduction
Light rail transit (LRT) is among the fastest growing modes of public transit in North America, with systems being built in many medium-sized North American cities, and with some larger cities also considering expansion of LRTs. The focus of this paper will be on the proposed Eglinton Crosstown LRT, which is planned to be fully completed in the early 2020s and will have both a direct airport connection and a substantial underground section. Figure 1 shows the Eglinton Crosstown LRT.
The history of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT has been politically contentious. There have been proposals for a rapid transit line under Eglinton since the early 1990s, when the Eglinton West subway was under construction. However, when Mike Harris’s Progressive Conservatives took power in Ontario in 1995, they cancelled the Eglinton West subway and its construction immediately. Between 1995 and 2007, there were no serious plans to construct an underground rapid transit line under Eglinton or any new light rail transit lines in the city, aside from those that are already planned, such as 510 Spadina, 509 Harbourfront, and the construction of the 512 St. Clair West LRT right-of-way (ROW). In 2007, then social democratic administration of Mayor David Miller proposed the Transit City Plan, with the Eglinton Crosstown LRT being the most important line. However, since fiscal conservative Rob Ford became mayor in 2010, his administration modified the Eglinton Crosstown LRT by lengthening its underground portion (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). He cancelled all other LRT lines within the Transit City proposal in order to fund the extension of the Sheppard Line to fulfil his promise to those who oppose LRTs in general and to spur development there (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). He believes that surface LRTs slow traffic down (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). Rob Ford supporters, who are primarily fiscal conservative middle class suburbanites, along with those who are opposed to LRTs, criticize Transit City harshly by using ad hominem attacks on the Miller administration and their supporters, especially pertaining to the construction of the St. Clair West LRT ROW (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011).
I support former mayor David Miller’s Transit City proposal, in terms of his vision for the development of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, based on the comparisons and lessons learned from two other Canadian and twelve American LRT systems with similar characteristics. These lessons suggest that having ample developable land, sufficient demand, and a favourable policy environment are necessary for the system to increase ridership and become less reliant on subsidies. In the next section of this paper, I will discuss the literature behind LRTs. I will go on to discuss the specifics of the LRT systems, and finally, I will discuss and analyze the Eglinton Crosstown LRT in terms of its potential for success.
Literature Review
Before there were LRTs, streetcars were used in many North American cities. Historically, both the public and urban planners have discouraged streetcar construction in North America. Streetcar services were abandoned in the early and mid-twentieth century in many North American cities, in favour of buses and the private motor vehicle. Toronto is a notable exception, as it accepted many streetcars from various North American cities that abandoned these services (Huang, 1996; Schumann and Loetterle, 2003; Thompson, 2003). However, since the late twentieth century, LRTs have become extremely popular and widely implemented, largely due to their success in many northern European cities (Huang, 1996; Schumann and Loetterle, 2003; Thompson, 2003). The rest of this literature review will outline the debate over the technical aspects, ridership effects, service area, and development effects that contribute to the rather recent popularity of this mode of public transit in North America.
Technical Information
LRTs run on rails, generally along streets or on other designated rights-of-way. They are not grade-separated, which means that motor vehicles and pedestrians are free to cross the rights-of-way. To allow for non-grade separation, LRTs use overhead wires. LRTs have higher capacities, have longer lifespans, and are faster than bus rapid transit (BRT) systems, but they are more expensive and have fewer stops. LRTs are less expensive and have more stops/stations than subways do, but they also have a lower capacity, lifespan, and speed. Therefore, LRTs provide a medium capacity mode of rapid public transit that has a moderate cost and provides a compromise between speed and stop/station frequency (Schumann and Loetterle, 2003; McBrayer, 2003; Polzin and Page, 2003; Thompson, 2003; Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual, 2nd Edition (TC&QSM), 2009). One major disadvantage of LRTs over BRTs is that LRTs cannot be rerouted with ease whenever an incident occurs. This is because LRTs run on rails, while its feeder lines can first run in mixed traffic and then feed into BRT rights-of-way (Schumann and Loetterle, 2003; McBrayer, 2003; Thompson, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009).
Ridership Effects
Ridership statistics of LRTs can be affected by the perceptions of the LRT held by potential commuters. These social perceptions may influence the success of an LRT system (Demetry and Higgins, 2003; Huang, 1996; Thompson, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009). The examples of LRTs in northern European cities suggest that the aesthetics and perceived comfort of LRTs draw in new commuters to increase ridership levels, given that it has potential improve the streetscape and improve its social perception. This advantage allows LRTs to have a strong potential to attract ridership, unlike subways, which does not have a strong presence on the streetscape (Demetry and Higgins, 2003; Thompson, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009). Another social factor influencing the success of an LRT system is its image by word-of-mouth. Bad experiences by commuters can create a negative impact on ridership, because these bad experiences spread quickly through word-of-mouth among disgruntled commuters (Huang, 1996; TC&QSM, 2009).
Service Areas
LRTs are generally found in downtown areas in medium-sized cities with populations between 100,000 and 1,000,000. They are also found in suburban areas of large metropolitan centres, with the core city having a population of over 1,000,000 people (See for example, Huang, 1996; Schumann and Loetterle, 2003; Thompson, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009). Los Angeles, Calgary, and Toronto are exceptions, as they are core cities that have a population of over 1,000,000 people, yet these cities have LRTs in their respective downtown areas. Large catchment areas, which consist of outlying suburban neighbourhoods and employment districts, are needed for LRTs to sustain their operation in medium-sized cities and large suburban areas (Kuby, Barranda, and Upchurch, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009). They have buses that feed into the LRT systems, as well as park-and-ride opportunities at the busier LRT stations. LRTs are suited to medium-sized cities and suburbs, because they are a cost effective alternative to subways, given the lower population density, yet provide a larger capacity than BRTs do (Kuby, Barranda, and Upchurch, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009). In some larger cities, such as Boston, Los Angeles, and Toronto, LRTs themselves are feeder routes to their respective subway systems (Kuby, Barranda, and Upchurch, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009).
Land Use Change and Favourable Policy
LRTs also have potential to influence land use change. Huang (1996) identifies having ample land suitable for development and densification, and a favourable policy environment for LRT construction as prerequisites for development success, along with the aforementioned demand. LRTs are believed to revitalize derelict neighbourhoods, due to their draw factor and its accompanying development, especially given the low cost of LRT construction (see for example, some of the articles used from the Ninth National Light Rail Transit Conference (NNLRTC), 2003; TC&QSM, 2009). Its construction encourages land use change and densification in the immediate area and has a strong potential to gentrify the surrounding area, which provides additional funding for revitalization. These sources suggest that mixed-income housing can also be built near the line to alleviate the negative implications of gentrification. This is because LRTs are perceived to create gentrification, but LRTs in fact serve as agents to the gentrification process (Huang, 1996).
However, critics of LRTs argue that they are not the panacea to revitalizing a dilapidated urban district. LRTs do not necessarily lead to the revitalization of the nearby neighbourhoods, in terms of land use change and densification, because their construction interrupts nearby businesses and long-term development of land is not necessarily guaranteed (Huang, 1996). Yet, if revitalization is successful due to the implementation of an LRT line, then gentrification may displace low-income residents and businesses, since they can no longer afford the rent (Huang, 1996; Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee, 1996). Thus, politicians have to balance the viewpoints of both sides of the debate to satisfy the majority of the populace, thereby presenting a favourable policy environment.
The literature review has provided the theoretical criteria for the Eglinton Crosstown LRT to be successful. These include the need to provide sufficient demand for both the LRT system in terms of ridership and real estate development, ample land for development, and a favourable policy environment. The review suggests that a balance between capacity, speed, frequency, and cost are necessary to achieve these criteria, as well as having high-density redevelopment along the route.
Analysis of Specific LRT Systems
Though the theoretical examples outlined above predict the measures of success, the practical examples provide a more concrete analysis of LRT success. This will be particularly relevant for the proposed Eglinton Crosstown LRT. I limited my analysis to LRT systems in North America that are similar to the Eglinton Crosstown LRT. These similarities include having direct connections with an airport and having a substantial underground section, in which at least two consecutive stations must be in the same underground portion and/or at least one underground portion must be at least two kilometres long.
I have identified fourteen such systems, twelve in the United States and two in Canada. These include the Baltimore Light Rail, Buffalo Metro Rail, the Calgary C-Train, the Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) Light Rail, the Edmonton Light Rail Transit, and the Green Line of Boston’s Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). More examples include the Los Angeles County Metro Rail (with emphasis on the Gold Line), the Hiawatha Line in Minneapolis, the Newark Light Rail, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) Subway—Surface Trolley Lines, the Metropolitan Area Express (MAX) Light Rail in Portland, the MetroLink in St. Louis, the Muni Metro in San Francisco, and the Central Link in Seattle. All of these systems operate in the downtown areas of their respective cities, with some extending towards the suburbs.
Data collection methods affect these statistics, which in turn, affect potential ridership of LRTs. There is a methodological bias underestimating passenger use of public transit in general, particularly LRTs, given their street presence (Henry, 2003; TC&QSM, 2009). I recognize that there is this error in the methodology, but there are no better alternatives than this.
First, I will discuss the technical aspects of some of the LRT systems. Second, I will analyze and evaluate the total capital costs and costs per passenger of select LRT systems. Third, I will compare the ridership levels and overall success of the Calgary C-Train and the MBTA Green Line, since these two systems have the highest weekday ridership figures. Fourth, I will compare transit-oriented developments (TODs) along the Hiawatha Line and the MAX Light Rail, because they are well documented in literature. All of these measures are important to gauge the potential success of LRT systems.
Technical Comparisons
The opening dates of the LRT systems vary significantly, from as early as 1897 for the MBTA Green Line to as recent as 2009 for the Seattle Central Link. However, the first modern LRT system in North America was opened in Edmonton in 1978, as prior systems are in fact streetcar systems and the Edmonton Light Rail serves as a template for later LRT systems in the continent. All of the LRT systems identified have overhead wires and are not grade separated. All but the Buffalo Metro Rail and the Newark Light Rail are identified as being purely government-operated, which vary from state level (the St. Louis MetroLink is the only bi-state-operated system identified) to single- and multiple-county level to single- and multiple-municipality level. Regarding the exceptions, the Buffalo Metro Rail is the sole public-private partnership in the survey and the outermost section of the Newark Light Rail is privately owned.
All of the LRT systems identified except for the Baltimore Light Rail system have substantial underground sections. The LRT system in the survey with the longest underground section is the Muni Metro of San Francisco, with a length of 8.9 km with nine stations in that section. The LRT system in the survey with the most underground stations is the MBTA Green Line with eleven stations within a single 7.2 km underground section that branches out. Some LRT systems, especially the older systems, have average station frequencies of approximately 500 metres, with underground sections having a much higher average station frequency, which translate to slow average speeds. Meanwhile, the newer LRT systems have much lower average station frequencies, with the DART Light Rail having the lowest average station frequency of 2.15 km, which translates to rapid service.
Finances
The total capital costs of construction and the capital cost per passenger are important to determine the success of an LRT system and potential real estate developments. This is because many transit agencies have a limited budget and they need to provide as much service to as many potential commuters as provided in the budget. In addition, transit agencies also need to attract real estate development to maximize profits, while minimizing the costs of investing in the LRT system, which is generally possible through increasing ridership levels.
According to the Calgary’s C-Train – Effective Capital Utilization press release, the total capital cost of the C-Train is C$543 million in 2005 dollars. This is compared with C$310 million for Edmonton, US$992.1 million for north-eastern New Jersey, and US$510.6 million for Buffalo. The capital costs per weekday passenger are C$2400 for Calgary and C$8900 for Edmonton based on when the system was built and the then current ridership statistics, using 2005 dollars. This is compared with the relatively high capital costs per weekday passengers of US$44,300 for north-eastern New Jersey and US$32,000 for Buffalo. This means that the Calgary C-Train and Edmonton Light Rail Transit are cost-effective, which allows them expand the system to maximize their respective catchment areas, which in turn increases ridership and demand for transit expansion. This effective spending is also beneficial, because the governments of those two cities have more resources to spend on other initiatives, while maintaining effective LRT systems, thereby presenting a low opportunity cost.
Meanwhile, the capital costs per weekday passenger are relatively high in the case of north-eastern New Jersey and Buffalo. This creates doubts over the success of LRT in north-eastern New Jersey and Buffalo, hindering potential expansion plans in those urban areas. The high costs per passenger in these two urban areas creates doubt over the effectiveness of the budgeting of the transit system, which would not allow them to be able to spend on other initiatives, thereby presenting a high opportunity cost. With high opportunity costs, it would also deter real estate development, since developers are very unlikely to receive returns on the investment of an unsuccessful LRT system (Huang, 1996). Huang (1996) suggests that in order to attract real estate development, LRT systems must be inexpensive per person served, to create demand for the system to further the success of nearby real estate development. This is because with increased ridership levels, the capital cost per rider decreases, thereby presenting low opportunity costs to expand the system and meet the demand for high-density real estate development (Ibid.).
Ridership Comparisons
Another way to determine success is through ridership figures. This is because increased ridership allows the LRT system to operate and eventually expand to increase its catchment area and to attract new development opportunities. According to the APTA’s 2010 Third Quarter Ridership statistics, Calgary’s C-Train had a daily ridership of 252,600, which represents an increase of 4.02% from the past year and is the second busiest LRT system in Anglo-America after Toronto’s streetcar system. The Green Line of the MBTA in Boston had a daily ridership of 215,400, which represents a 0.05% decrease from the past year and is the third busiest LRT system in Anglo-America (Ibid.). There are plans to expand the Green Line, demonstrating its success as an LRT system in the United States. The Green Line’s proposed extension projected to increase the daily ridership of the Green Line by 30,700 by 2030 (Certificate on the Final Environmental Impact Report, 2010).
Though the Green Line of the MBTA serves a dense city, which would imply high ridership, the C-Train in Calgary has a higher ridership (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C-Train, 2011). This is due to Calgary’s much lower population density, as well as the city’s rapidly growing population and favourable policies, thereby presenting opportunities to develop land, which in turn, create a much higher ridership potential (Ibid.). The resultant density for Calgary will be very high, but not high enough to exceed that of Boston (Ibid.). In addition, unlike Boston, Calgary does not have expressways that cut through its downtown core. This encourages commuters to take the C-Train downtown, which increases demand for the system (Ibid.). However, Boston’s metropolitan area has approximately four times the population of Calgary’s, which justifies the need to have expressways and have reduced LRT usage (Ibid.). Thus Boston and Calgary can be used as examples for determining the factors that lead to increased ridership, which include having sufficient amounts of developable land, having sufficient demand to take the LRT, and favourable policies that allow for expansion, with Calgary having all three factors.
Transit-Oriented Developments
Finally, the third determinant of success of the LRT system is based on the success of land use changes near the system in question, especially in the context of transit-oriented developments. This is because, according to Huang (1996), developable land can include the densification of existing built-up land required to create demand for the LRT system. Once an effective LRT system is built, the area becomes more desirable. This leads to a growing need to increase the density of the area, which in turn, creates demand for the LRT system.
One of the many effects of the opening of the Hiawatha Line in Minneapolis included congestion along the corridor being reduced 20% between 1997 and 2007, which likely reduced air pollution as well (Goetz et al., 2008). In addition, there was significant mid-rise condominium development surrounding the stations along the line, with a few thousand residents occupying each condominium with vacancy rates below ten percent (Ibid.). This meant that the population density of the area likely increased as well (Ibid.). The completion of the Hiawatha Line directly contributed to community revitalization as developers became attracted to the corridor. Thus, transit-oriented developments in Minneapolis were successful in terms of reducing congestion, increasing population density, and contributing to the revitalization of the community (Ibid.). As a result, Metro Transit (of the Twin Cities) plans to add a few new branch lines serving other suburban areas within the Minneapolis-St. Paul area (Ibid.).
Portland, Oregon also has its fair share of transit-oriented developments that are successful for different reasons. Podobnik (2002) identified one such transit-oriented development of Orenco Station, centred around the namesake MAX Light Rail station. This neighbourhood is designed in the New Urbanist style, which emphasizes high density, walkability, public transit use, and reduced private motor vehicle use (Ibid.). Just over 69% of those surveyed said that they use public transit more when they lived in Orenco Station, as compared with their previous neighbourhoods (Ibid.). Thus, the examples of the Hiawatha Line and Orenco Station provide evidence that support Huang (1996)’s logic, in which a successful LRT system is necessary to bring forth increased real estate development in the immediate area that has this potential.
Discussion and Analysis of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT
The Eglinton Crosstown LRT will be municipally-operated and have two underground sections, one being over twelve kilometres long and containing twelve stations in that section, plus another very short underground section containing one more station, bringing the total to thirteen underground stations. The average station frequency will be approximately 767 metres and the underground section will have an average station frequency of approximately 500 metres, thereby providing a compromise between speed and frequency (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009, 2010ab). The ridership is projected to be 53 million riders per year in 2021, which is approximately 205,000 riders per weekday, based on the assumption that there are 260 weekdays in a year and weekends and statutory holidays are negligible (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009). As shown in Figure 2, LRTs are the preferred technology, based on ridership projections, given that it requires a higher capacity than BRTs, but the ridership projections are too low to justify subway construction. According to Section 2a of the Environmental Project Report (Toronto Transit Commission, 2010a), BRTs do not have the potential to further the densification of the area surrounding Eglinton Avenue, unlike LRTs or subways.
Lessons Learned from Other LRT Systems
The planned total cost of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT is projected to be much more expensive than any LRT system in the survey, mainly because the Eglinton Crosstown LRT’s underground section will be much longer than that of the Muni Metro by approximately three kilometres. This means that significant densification is necessary to create demand to attract enough riders to cover the cost of the line’s construction.
In addition, there is a supportive policy environment regarding the construction of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, even under the governance of the anti-LRT mayor Rob Ford. He wanted to use all of the provincial money meant for the entire Transit City initiative to be reallocated to only the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, with an extended underground section through North York and Scarborough (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). This is because he identified that the Eglinton Crosstown LRT as more important than any other proposed LRT line, because a substantial section of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT is underground, thereby reducing surface traffic congestion (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). Another advantage of having the Eglinton Crosstown LRT underground is that its operations would be weatherproof, thereby providing convenience for commuters. However, given that the Eglinton Crosstown LRT is primarily underground means that commuters have to travel further between the entrance and the platform than if it were on the surface. This is unlike the rest of Transit City that had been cancelled, which primarily have LRT lines that run on the surface. This means that the Eglinton Crosstown LRT is so necessary, in terms of its high costs and its potential to increase the density of the area along the route that the Ford administration cannot afford to cancel it.
There have been plans to mitigate concerns that planners ignore the needs of the public, as it has been done with the other LRT systems in the continent. There have been numerous public consultations on the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, with four public open houses, such that the public can have input over the design of the LRT line (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009, 2010ab). For example, due to public consultations, Brentcliffe Station was removed, while Laird Station was included instead, since the area around Laird Drive is identified as being busier than around Brentcliffe Road (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009, 2010ab). Thus, the examples of the fourteen LRT systems in Anglo-America serve as examples for the proposed Eglinton Crosstown LRT.
Analysis of Feasibility
The Eglinton Crosstown LRT has to be built in such a way that it maximizes the opportunities to increase land value. By doing so, it would increase the density of the land along the route and maximize ridership levels. However, the Eglinton Crosstown LRT must minimize disruption to existing properties and motorists and minimize capital and opportunity costs as well. As shown in Figure 3, the existing land use tends to consist of high-rise residential areas between Bathurst Street and Bayview Avenue, with medium-density residential areas between Keele and Bathurst Streets, and between Bayview Avenue and the West Branch of the Don River. In the Etobicoke section, there is an undeveloped corridor, which can accommodate the widening of Eglinton Avenue there, and north and south of the corridor is both low-density housing and high-rise apartments. The North York section mainly consists of parkland, with the eastern part of this section having medium-density residences. The Scarborough section mainly consists of low-density big-box retail, but between Birchmount Road and Kennedy Station, there are also medium- and high-density residential areas. Educational institutions (i.e. schools and libraries), as well as open spaces, are found along the Eglinton Crosstown LRT.
There is already significant potential for increased residential and commercial densification of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT corridor. According to Section 4b of the Environmental Project Report (Toronto Transit Commission, 2010a), there are 38 development applications within the study area, as well as 27 site plan applications, 15 OPA/rezoning applications, eight condominium applications for six different locations, two part lot applications, and one subdivision application. These applications are distributed rather evenly throughout the corridor, with approximately half of the applications being near the central underground section. The approval of the construction of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT would likely see an increase in the number of applications that would lead to the densification of the corridor. Based on the analysis of the land use map, I propose that there is strong development potential at the Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough sections, given their low-density nature, as well as sufficient undeveloped land along those sections.
The increased residential and commercial densification of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, as well as the projected increase in the population of the Greater Toronto Area to 8.6 million in 2031, with one-fifth of that growth being projected to be in the City of Toronto, will lead to increased ridership levels (Toronto Transit Commission, 2010a). To maximize the ridership level, the trip has to be rapid, as well as having frequent stops. Since those two conditions oppose each other, a compromise had to be made. The underground sections have lower station frequencies to increase the speed of the system, as well as to minimize construction costs, given the convenience of having weatherproof stations at the cost of having to travel further between the entrance and the platform.
Not only is the physical infrastructure is important for the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, but the rolling stock and its operation are important factors as well. The rolling stock, based on European design, will consist of two to three connected cars that have driver-operation on both ends of the vehicle, with the light rail vehicle running automated in the underground section (Ibid.). Each car in the trainset will have a capacity of 130 passengers, 260 passengers for a two-car trainset, and 390 passengers for a three-car trainset, not unlike that of the rolling stock used in the operation of the Hiawatha Line in Minneapolis (Ibid.). The average speed of the vehicle will be projected to be 28-31 km/h in the west surface section, 22-25 km/h in the east surface section, and 32km/h in the underground section (Ibid.). Service is anticipated to be as frequent as 3 to 3½ minutes during peak hours and 6 minutes during off-peak hours, weekends, and statutory holidays (Ibid, 2009). The Eglinton Crosstown LRT is also built to entice motorists to switch to taking public transit, given the expected increase in traffic congestion, due to the projected increase in the use of private motor vehicles over time (Ibid, 2010a). This means that the operation is projected to be rapid, yet have frequent stops and a medium capacity and lifespan, to maximize the ridership potential of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT.
One of the challenges the Eglinton Crosstown LRT has to face is that it has to minimize the disruption of property, as well as motorists. In order to construct the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, there has to be significant relocation of many utilities, particularly sewers, electricity, and natural gas, many of which are directly below the surface of Eglinton Avenue (Ibid.). In addition, the construction of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT requires the expropriation of 149 properties and the encroachment of five park(ette)s (Ibid.). The five park(ette)s need to be encroached upon in order to widen Eglinton Avenue, as well as to construct station entrances, emergency exits, traction power substations, and ventilation shafts (Ibid.). For the same reasons, 149 properties had to be expropriated (Ibid.). Of the 149 property acquisitions, 45 are full acquisitions and 104 are partial acquisitions, while 88 acquisitions occur of private property and 61 acquisitions occur of public property (Ibid.). The 88 acquisitions of private property include 45 partial acquisitions and 43 full acquisitions (Ibid.). In addition, 29 of the total property acquisitions are east of Yonge Street, with the rest being west of Yonge Street (Ibid). The Toronto Transit Commission will provide the owners of the expropriated properties fair market value. Four buildings that are identified as cultural heritage will be displaced, while three cultural heritage buildings will be disrupted in the construction process. Business operations will also be disrupted during construction, in terms of lost on-street parking spaces and modifications to pedestrian access. This means that the Eglinton Crosstown LRT would affect many properties, businesses, and utilities during its construction, which has to be minimized to prevent a repeat of the controversy surrounding the construction of the St. Clair West LRT ROW, which formed the basis of the anti-LRT sentiments among Rob Ford supporters.
Another major challenge the Eglinton Crosstown LRT would have to face is the accommodation of motorists. Newly elected mayor Rob Ford promised that new transit lines should not substantially affect motorists (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). To accommodate the needs of motorists, the central section is to be constructed underground, with tunnelled sections between stations, which are cut-and-cover (Toronto Transit Commission, 2010a). This is because Eglinton Avenue is too narrow to accommodate LRT service and maintain two lanes of traffic per direction, given that the width of that section of Eglinton Avenue being 20-25m (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009, 2010a). The surface sections will require roads to be widened to maintain two lanes of traffic per direction, given that the surface sections are over 30m wide, and bridges have to be widened accordingly (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009, 2010a). The optimal width of the surface sections of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT is 36m (Toronto Transit Commission, 2010a). Since the intersections will have advanced green lights for light rail vehicles and the need to construct stop platforms, Michigan lefts are used, as shown in Figure 4 (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009, 2010a). With a Michigan left, motorists would continue past the intersection and make a U-turn at the designated left turn signal (Toronto Transit Commission, 2009, 2010a). This type of traffic management implementation has been in use since the 1960s in the state of Michigan with success, hence the name Michigan left (Toronto Transit Commission, 2010a). Michigan lefts will be implemented at Martin Grove Road, Kipling Avenue, Islington Avenue, Royal York Road, Scarlett Road, Jane Street, and Birchmount Road (Ibid.). With these traffic management strategies, traffic congestion will be relieved by a few minutes with the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, as compared with the current situation (Ibid.). Thus, the Eglinton Crosstown LRT will be constructed to accommodate motorists as well.
My proposal, being based on the Miller administration’s Transit City plan, is much less expensive, simply because the section between Leslie Street and Kennedy Station will be on the surface, save for Don Mills, which will be underground (Toronto Transit Commission, 2010a). This is because the average width of Eglinton Avenue east of the West Branch of Don River easily exceeds 30m and there is more than enough space on both sides to widen Eglinton Avenue to the recommended 36m in that section (Ibid.). Because of Rob Ford’s plan to satisfy motorists and those who oppose LRTs, the other lines in the Transit City proposal had to be scrapped in order to fund the extended underground section of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, thereby presenting higher opportunity costs (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). It seems that the Ford administration’s plan to have an extended underground section of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT runs counter to the other major promise made by Rob Ford, to respect taxpayers by minimizing spending by the city.
The aforementioned three determinants of the success of LRTs provide examples for the proposal to construct Eglinton Crosstown LRT. Along Eglinton Avenue, especially at the surface sections of the line, mainly in Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough, there is sufficient developable land, not unlike that of Calgary, Minneapolis, or Portland. The abundance of developable land has potential to be a major asset to the success of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT. Examples of developable land in the area include the Richview Corridor in the Etobicoke section, the Don Parklands in the North York Section, and the Golden Mile in the Scarborough section. Though the Golden Mile is already built up, it has low-density retail, which has a very strong potential for densification. All of these developable lands are areas that have strong potential for densification necessary to support the Eglinton Crosstown LRT.
Regarding the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, based on the lessons learned from other cities’ LRT systems, I believe that the Miller administration’s plan to construct the Eglinton Crosstown LRT under the Transit City proposal would be both convenient yet cost effective, as well as maximizing ridership and real estate development potential, based on my feasibility analysis.
Conclusion
[FONT="] In conclusion, based on the theoretical successes of LRT-oriented real estate developments, the Eglinton Crosstown must have sufficient demand, ample developable land, and a favourable policy environment. The Eglinton Crosstown LRT must be constructed to attract as many riders as possible with the premise of convenience at the cost of having to travel further, but to minimize capital and opportunity costs that would be better spent on other initiatives, the underground section of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT cannot be too long. There is ample developable land along the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, particularly in the Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough sections, which have low-density residential and commercial areas, as well as open parkland. There is also a favourable policy environment, particularly with the governance of a mayor who opposes LRTs. The Ford administration wanted the Eglinton Crosstown LRT to be underground between Keele Street and Kennedy Station just to satisfy the motorists and those who prefer to have a weatherproof commute (Foran, 2011; Kalinowski, 2011; Rider, 2011). However, that would significantly increase the costs to construct the line, thereby increasing opportunity costs, which meant that the other LRT lines in the Transit City proposal had to be cancelled. Based on my analysis, I believe that the Ford administration’s Eglinton Crosstown LRT plan is not as feasible as the one based on the Miller administration’s Transit City proposal. This is because the Transit City proposal has a sufficiently long underground section without being excessive and motorists can be easily accommodated in the east surface section of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT. In all, the Transit City version of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT is preferred over the Ford administration’s version, based on the theoretical and actual examples of other LRT systems in North America.
