crs1026
Superstar
Having someone at the top who could be bamboozled by technical staff or their corporate overlords and has no idea what a bearing is or how tight a turning radii ought to be for a train leaves open an incredible risk.
Of course, I oppose P3s entirely for reasons I've outlined elsewhere, and I won't belabour that.
But whether you look at Ottawa, or closer to home with the Eglinton Crosstown, where rails were laid incorrectly, and where radios were installed that were not compatible with the operator's radio network (TTC), I don't think P3 staff should be trusted with billions of the public purse without knowledgeable oversight.
That doesn't have to be the CEO; but the problem is VIA HFR (as opposed to VIA) has no technical staff of its own; without a background in the rail sector, how do you even know who to hire to assist you?
I would be very skeptical of a CEO who spent their time poring over drawings and engineering calculations to the degree where they could spot this kind of design disconnect. (I have seen senior execs who liked to do this - and generally they were ineffective leaders, in the wrong roles - because in fact they were excellent technical people, but managing a team that is solving a problem is about gathering information and aligning various units and stakeholders.... and not being the one who could troubleshoot or identify the technical flaw).
The question is, were there people at lower levels who observed these issues - and did the organization and hierarchy encourage them to speak up, and how did the organization respond when they did. And did the designers work as a team or in silos.
From what I have read of the Ottawa inquiry, it's very apparent that the mentality set by project leadership was "get it done, don't create issues don't admit to problems". And some disfunctional left hand-right hand relationships among the various contractors and the City team.
- Paul