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TTC: Other Items (catch all)

New York Times runs a piece on the NY Subway relevant to Toronto's predicament of funding, management, and whether annexation by the Province might be the best solution:
Fixing New York City’s subway crisis will require taking the drastic step of creating a state-controlled corporation dedicated solely to rebuilding and modernizing the city’s teetering subway system, according to a new report from an influential urban research and advocacy group.

The Regional Plan Association, whose board includes business and civic leaders, called on Thursday for a “subway reconstruction public benefit corporation” that would have “a focused mandate, streamlined authority, and sufficient funding to rebuild the entire subway system within 15 years.” It was one of the key proposals in a sweeping new report that addresses the many problems confronting a growing New York region, including decaying transportation and infrastructure, a shortage of affordable housing and the threat posed by climate change.

The subways are currently operated and financed by the state-run Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which oversees a sprawling network of subways, buses, railroads, bridges and tunnels. The report described the authority as “an enormous legacy institution” hobbled by competing internal priorities, bureaucratic rules and practices, and a lack of funding. As a result, the report said, it has been too slow to make improvements and adopt modern technology, leaving a backlog of critical infrastructure projects.

“We’re talking about building a subway system for the 21stcentury, and we can’t rely on a 20th-century agency to do it,” said Scott Rechler, a real estate executive who is the chairman of the Regional Plan Association and also a board member of the transportation authority.

One of the group’s boldest suggestions takes aim at one of the subway’s most cherished qualities — that it never closes. The association said the subway should be shut down in the wee hours to more rapidly fix what is broken and add the upgrades that are sorely needed.

The report took five years to produce and aims to provide a comprehensive blueprint for the future. It is only the fourth such report to be released by the association in nearly a century. Three previous reports — in 1929, 1968 and 1996 — helped lay the groundwork for public works projects, including bridges and highways, economic development, and preservation of parkland and open space. The 1996 report called for building a Second Avenue subway and creating a business district on the Far West Side of Manhattan, both of which are now a reality.

The fourth report looks broadly at the transportation system in the New York region, saying its failures are the consequence of years of underinvestment even as demand for services grew and advancing technology raised customer expectations. It proposes building a second bus terminal under the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center on Manhattan’s West Side to consolidate intercity buses and free up space at the crowded Port Authority Bus Terminal, and expanding subway and regional rail service and connections.

Nowhere are the problems more urgent than in the city’s subways, which have been crippled by constant breakdowns, soaring delays and overcrowding. The city comptroller, Scott M. Stringer, recently estimated that subway delays were costing the city economy as much as $389 million annually in lost wages and productivity. [...article continues at length...]
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/...ubways-under-new-leadership-report-urges.html

As much as Byford will be facing a massive challenge to 'turn around' the NY Subway, it's ironic that he'll have more effective allies in doing it there than here.

This report, although from an independent org, is very influential, and historic. This isn't the Scarborough Subway Salubrious One Stop Committee...

Byford just might find that he's given a lot of ammunition to take on the battle needed. Funding will hopefully follow, and in a lot shorter time than it ever will in Toronto.
[...]
The report did not provide any cost estimates for creating a subway corporation, but noted that there would be “upfront legal and administrative costs” in addition to capital expenses for the subways. It said that dedicated revenue sources would be necessary to support the subway corporation, such as taxes, fees or congestion pricing. Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo is expected to announce a congestion pricing plan early next year for the city.
[...]
This is the path London has taken, and so far as per Crossrail, promises to be a massive success. It's not just the infrastructure itself, it's also the governance model...a *Limited Company* formed by the London Council and the National Government, each as equal shareholders.

New Yorkers have taken close note, been written about in many of the quality US publications, and it's the model this looks to emulate.

And then there's Toronto...
 
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As much as Byford will be facing a massive challenge to 'turn around' the NY Subway, it's ironic that he'll have more effective allies in doing it there than here.

TTCs issues have largely been restricted to underfunding, and the occasionally politically motivated mega-project, such as Line 4 or the SSE. The MTA has been experiencing that, in addition to decades of detrimental micromanagement from the state government, and occasionally outright corruption. Why you'd think Byford would find better allies in NY State than he did here in Toronto and Ontario is beyond me.

There is a reason New York has the worlds worst run major metro system, and officials in New York State and New York City (but mostly the state government, as they control the MTA) bare the responsibility.

This NY Times article has a good overview of the what's been going on in New York: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/nyregion/new-york-subway-system-failure-delays.html

A few excerpts:

The subway’s budget has not only been squeezed. It has been milked.

A bill passed by the Legislature in 1989 included a provision that lets state officials impose a fee on bonds issued by public authorities. The fee was largely intended to compensate the state for helping understaffed authorities navigate the borrowing process. It was to be a small charge, no more than 0.2 percent of the value of bond issuance

The charge has quietly grown into a revenue stream for the state. And a lot of the money has been sapped from one authority in particular: the M.T.A.

The authority — a sophisticated operation that contracts with multiple bond experts — has had to pay $328 million in bond issuance fees over the past 15 years.

In some years, it has been charged fees totaling nearly 1 percent of its bond issuances, far more than foreseen under the original law.

Under Mr. Pataki, the state eliminated subsidies for the M.T.A., opting to make the authority rely entirely on fares, tolls and revenue from taxes and fees earmarked for transit. It also ended state funding for capital work.

Mr. Pataki also started a trend of redirecting revenues from taxes. In 1995, he pushed through a state income tax cut and helped pay for it by taking more than $200 million in tax revenues that had been set aside for transit. His three successors followed suit. At least $850 million has been diverted in the past two decades, records show.


Mr. Silver, who was then Assembly speaker and one of the state’s most powerful politicians, envisioned not just a subway station in his district but a soaring transit hub, “the Grand Central of Downtown,” complete with an enormous glass dome and mirrors to filter sunlight into underground passageways.

By 2008, the cost had shot past its original $750 million budget, and M.T.A. leaders decided to scale back the project. But Mr. Silver sent a letter threatening to veto the authority’s funding if he did not get what he wanted. The M.T.A. quickly fell in line.

In the end, the project cost $1.4 billion — more than the total annual budget of Chicago’s rapid transit system — and did nothing to improve the subway’s signals or tracks.

Perhaps nothing has hamstrung the M.T.A. more than a maneuver Mr. Pataki introduced in 2000.

That year, Bear Stearns, then a Wall Street powerhouse, approached the governor with a proposal to alleviate an M.T.A. budget crunch: If the authority refinanced $12 billion of its debt, the bank said, it could get a huge influx of cash without having to pay for years.

Critics denounced the move, saying it was a “debt bomb” that would hurt future generations. But the lawmakers eventually signed off, and the M.T.A. agreed to the deal in 2002.

The bankers and bond underwriters — many of whom had ties to Mr. Pataki or had donated to his campaign — earned an estimated $85 million.

Mr. Pataki did not return messages seeking comment.

Today, bonds have become the biggest funding source for M.T.A.’s construction needs. The authority has borrowed about $15 billion in the past six years — about 52 percent of overall capital funding, records show. In the 1980s, only about 30 percent of capital work was financed by debt.

They stripped a combined $1.5 billion from the M.T.A. by repeatedly diverting tax revenues earmarked for the subways and also by demanding large payments for financial advice, I.T. help and other services that transit leaders say the authority could have done without.

They saddled the M.T.A. with debt and engineered a deal with creditors that brought in quick cash but locked the authority into paying $5 billion in interest that it otherwise never would have had to pay.

In one particularly egregious example, Mr. Cuomo’s administration forced the M.T.A. to send $5 million to bail out three state-run ski resorts that were struggling after a warm winter.

At the same time, public officials who have taken hundreds of thousands of dollars in political contributions from M.T.A. unions and contractors have pressured the authority into signing agreements with labor groups and construction companies that obligated the authority to pay far more than it had planned.

Lawmakers in Albany trimmed funding for subway maintenance throughout the 1990s, records show, even as the state budget grew from $45 billion to $80 billion. Then they kept funding mostly flat for years, despite the surge in ridership.
 
TTCs issues have largely been restricted to underfunding, and the occasionally politically motivated mega-project, such as Line 4 or the SSE.
Really? It's a hell of a lot more than just that. It's institutionalized poor managment.

Why you'd think Byford would find better allies in NY State than he did here in Toronto and Ontario is beyond me.
What *effective* allies did Byford have in Toronto?

You'll note the use of my stating "ironic".

BTW: MTA isn't just "controlled" by Albany. It's owned by the State, due to NYC's bankruptcy decades back. And yes, it's poorly run, but I repeat, Byford has powerful allies to work with in NYC. He was hired to institute the changes needed, just like in Toronto.

He wouldn't have left had he not been faced with a near impossible task here to improve the TTC further.

What org does Toronto/Ontario have to match the RPA?
http://www.rpa.org/programs

And btw, take a close look at their map and how they see progress and the future's regional influence as being trans-border:
national-issues-banner.jpg


See:
Why Does New York State Control the Subway? That’s the 20-Cent Question
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/nyregion/mta-subway-cuomo.html
for an excellent background on the NY Subway.

To tie this back into the TTC's future fortunes, a movement (albeit limp, this is Ontario and Toronto) (various studies are proposing this, and it's been discussed for generations) is looking to fold the TTC in whole or in part, into a regional transportation organization. ("Superlinx" has been suggested, along with "Streety Streetcar Face")

I note only favour that, with caveats, but feel it's unavoidable. Even Patrick Brown is espousing it, albeit someone will have to help Patrick with the big words and meaning...
 
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Someone should look into the principle of subsidiarity - expecting the state (or province) to do well in managing what is essentially a regional transit system flies against that - especially considering no small amount of the current malaise is directly caused by the higher level of government in the first place.

AoD
 
Someone should look into the principle of subsidiarity - expecting the state (or province) to do well in managing what is essentially a regional transit system flies against that - especially considering no small amount of the current malaise is directly caused by the higher level of government in the first place.

AoD
This is an essential part of the debate, and where London's model, after getting so many things wrong in the past, is somehow now getting it right. New York has remarked in envy of the London model quite a few times in the last few years. Crossrail is the shining example of finding a model that works. That is not a stand-alone success, however. TfL runs most bus service as by independent operators. That was a product of Con Gone Mad gov't in the past, albeit the model of the time could not prevail any longer.

The easiest way to describe a model for effective regional transit is highway. The Province runs major highways (and indirectly, through transfer of funding, Toronto and Region's expressways and parkways). Arterial and local roads are done by Regional and Muni levels.

This can and should be done for transit. If a local government (say, Georgetown) wants to keep 'poor folks down' and discourage their living there, they run *no* local buses.

Must run, but will detail this further later, it is an essential discussion for the TTC and Ontario in general. Absolutely agreed on ultimate responsibility for failures resting at QP. But therein also lies the only possible cure for the present malaise.

Back later.
 
This is an essential part of the debate, and where London's model, after getting so many things wrong in the past, is somehow now getting it right. New York has remarked in envy of the London model quite a few times in the last few years. Crossrail is the shining example of finding a model that works. That is not a stand-alone success, however. TfL runs most bus service as by independent operators. That was a product of Con Gone Mad gov't in the past, albeit the model of the time could not prevail any longer.

The easiest way to describe a model for effective regional transit is highway. The Province runs major highways (and indirectly, through transfer of funding, Toronto and Region's expressways and parkways). Arterial and local roads are done by Regional and Muni levels.

This can and should be done for transit. If a local government (say, Georgetown) wants to keep 'poor folks down' and discourage their living there, they run *no* local buses.

Must run, but will detail this further later, it is an essential discussion for the TTC and Ontario in general. Absolutely agreed on ultimate responsibility for failures resting at QP. But therein also lies the only possible cure for the present malaise.

Back later.

If you want to bring up TfL, you have to bring up regional governance (which oddly enough, we sort of have previously to a lesser degree with Metro Toronto). Metrolinx is not an example of such, nor will uploading subways (because why, the province or even MX has demonstrated expertise in such mode?) and highways in Ontario is a poor analogy as well.

AoD
 
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The TfL board is appointed by the Mayor of London, and it controls essentially all of London’s principle transport routes (not just subways). It is in no way similar to what has been proposed for Toronto.
 
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The TfL board is appointed by the Mayor of London, and it controls essentially all of London’s principle rail routes (not just subways). It is in no way similar to what has been proposed for Toronto.
Yes, TfL has a FAR wider mandate than anyone has proposed here. This from Wiki:

TfL has responsibility for London's network of principal road routes, for various rail networks including the London Underground, London Overground, Docklands Light Railway and TfL Rail, for London's trams, buses and taxis, for cycling provision, and for river services. The underlying services are provided by a mixture of wholly owned subsidiary companies (principally London Underground), by private sector franchisees (the remaining rail services, trams and most buses) and by licensees (some buses, taxis and river services). TfL is also responsible, jointly with the national Department for Transport (DfT), for commissioning the construction of the new Crossrail line, and will be responsible for franchising its operation once completed.[3]
 
The TfL board is appointed by the Mayor of London, and it controls essentially all of London’s principle transport routes (not just subways). It is in no way similar to what has been proposed for Toronto.

It's worth noting that the Mayor of London is in no way analogous to the Mayor of Toronto. Greater London is sort of like Metro, but on a much bigger scale - imagine a Metro that encompasses York, Durham, Peel and Halton as well as Toronto - and with a top-down structure instead of Metro's bottom-up, weak-leader system.
 
Streetcars are still stopping (or maybe crawling) before track switches. The TTC still cuts the needed funds to put in proper track switches because they are the first thing cut when the higher ups say to cut, cut, cut the TTC budget. There are no funds available.

Yet we are putting in far side streetcar stops. Why? If the streetcars have to stop before the track switches, that's where the streetcar stop should be. If they put in proper track switches, where the streetcar do not have to stop, then put in far side streetcar stops.

Again, it is the fiscal conservatives making transit begging for funds, but not getting it.
 
Been too busy of late to continue the thread I started, but some posters are exactly right on TfL, and "Regional" in the UK is analogous to "provincial" here, albeit without the constitutional powers accorded to provinces, although the UK is facing a degree of devolution...another matter another time.

TfL in a transportation sense is akin to the GTHA, now buying up rail lines (some in terms of franchise) to operate not only as routes *in* London, but routes *into* London, and doing it with the blessing of the National Rail Regulator and surrounding counties.

Toronto has to stop acting in isolation on major heavy transit routes that address regional transit, and concentrate on services that feed into that major trunk, and the trunk becomes a separate entity. That was my point initially, and still is. Queen's Park is as problematic on this as the TTC and Council though, and using GO and the TTC as political footballs really hasn't helped.

I'll try and get back to this string later with actual examples and details. Regional Transit in the GTHA, with few exceptions, is a mess. Whether one agrees with that term or not, it could be a hell of a lot better if the *trunks* are integrated into a whole, and the local services feeding those trunks are more adapted to local needs, thus my using the infamous "Georgetown" ('Keepin' them poo folks down) example.

Again I use the case of highways, supported and run by the 'Greater Whole' to transcend municipal borders for the benefit or all. Why should transit trunks be run any differently?
 
f the streetcars have to stop before the track switches, that's where the streetcar stop should be.
Of course, we all know the benefits of putting the stops on the far side, but you make an excellent point (pun not intended). It's like the King Street Project writ large. Expansive ideas defeated by having no budget to speak of to do it.

But talk about building subways to the Moon is entertained while the Rome Station burns.
 

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