Secretary of State James G. Blaine saw annexation as a way to eliminate continued and contentious competition over
fish and timber. Blaine, who co-authored the McKinley Tariff, publicly stated that he hoped for “a grander and nobler brotherly love, that may unite in the end” the United States and Canada “in one perfect union.” Blaine declared himself “teetotally opposed to giving the Canadians the sentimental satisfaction of waving the British Flag. . . and enjoying the actual remuneration of American markets.” Privately, he admitted to President Benjamin Harrison that by denying reciprocity, Canada would “ultimately, I believe, seek admission to the Union.”
Officials and free trade advocates in both Britain and Canada also understood the implications of the McKinley Tariff. Members of the Cobden Club, a prominent and influential London-based free-trade organization, called it an “outrage on civilization”—one that promised “to lead to the [American] annexation of Canada.” British Liberal Lyon Playfair warned that the law looked like “a covert attack on Canada.” If the tariff act’s objective “really be (as the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir John Macdonald, thinks) to force the United States lion and the Canadian lamb to lie down together, this can only be accomplished by the lamb being inside the lion,” he warned.
Yet, though both sides were convinced that the tariff would drive Canada into the arms of the U.S., it actually had the opposite effect. Nationalistic Canadians
argued that the tariff was “a heavy blow struck alike at our home industries and at the prosperity and independence of the Dominion of Canada — an unprovoked aggression, an attempt at conquest by fiscal war.”
Rather than compelling Canadians to seek annexation, the tariff stirred “love for Queen, flag, and country,” according to George T. Denison, president of the British Empire League in Canada. The majority of Canadians saw the McKinley tariff as part of “a conspiracy” to “betray this country into annexation.” They were having none of it. Their cultural and political ties with the British Empire, as well as their anger over the attempted coercion, proved stronger.
Canada’s Conservative Prime Minister John Macdonald wanted to react forcefully to send a message to the U.S. He proposed retaliating with high tariffs on American goods, as well as increased trade with Britain. He also recognized a political weapon when he was handed one. He adroitly turned the 1891 Canadian elections into a broader referendum concerning Canadian-American relations. He portrayed the Liberal opposition as being in bed with the Republican annexationists. According to him, they were involved in “a deliberate conspiracy, by force, by fraud, or by both, to force Canada into the American union.”