The point is, those standards will be arrived at with attention to more than just the absolute tensile strength of the carbody designs.
Some of the variables are obvious - if we can assure complete temporal and/or physical separation from freight, then the harm potential is reduced to the same level as some other systems..VIA and Alto may never reach that complete separation, however.
Assuming use of equivalent signalling and control technologies to other countries, we can assume equal potential to maintain separation between trains and control speed, reducing potential for human error. That brings us closer as well, but we aren't there yet. Even there, there is some potential for human error where individuals can override. (eg the incidents where track workers occupy an active track, or where a local train threw a switch in the face of an approaching VIA train)
I'm not so sure we have equivalency with respect to track condition and track maintenance. As we saw recently with USRC, there is both a question in adequacy of inspections (seems nobody noticed the as installed condition did not meet spec), and weather related realities (pretty hard to inspect track that is snow covered).I wonder how we measure up compared to other systems that operate under similar weather conditions. Even if we pull up our socks on inspection and maintenance, do things like freeze-thaw cycles and extreme heat-cold put us at greater risk.
None of us have the actual data that a regulator will look at - how many accidents overseas there are, how many originate in human error versus failure of equipment, how many are related to track, etc. I am simply suggesting that we can't assume that a particular design will be as safe on our system as it is elsewhere. That would potentially lead the regulator to want our equipment to be more robust, to compensate for other potential risks. We can speculate as spectators, but the experts may have different numbers
- Paul