hw621
Senior Member
Is Ford taking the Hydro One approach here?
Metrolinx has fail on many fronts and it starts at the top.A question I would like to ask is should we want Metrolinx to fail?
No!A question I would like to ask is should we want Metrolinx to fail?
So I found a reference or two that describes what you are saying, albeit less scandalously:
Basically, Metrolinx only started studying capacity costraints at Union after the revitalization was underway. Some of the options they study (e.g. additional tracks under Union) are rendered unfeasible by the work ongoing with the revitalisation:
It's still part of their medium-term plans isn't it for RER? I thought they'd long ago concluded there wasn't enough capacity.Interestingly, Metrolinx actually got pretty far on the design of additional tracks under Union. General station plans were produced along with renderings. Vision was for 4 tracks under Union, costing around $900 million.
From what we've seen of Ford's actions so far, it's hard to believe he wouldn't swing the axe hard and deep at Metrolinx. He's referred to them as "Liberal Elites" a number of times...and I suspect we'll be seeing a lot more 'private' schemes to get things done. That could be a mixed blessing, depending on how it's handled, and by whom. I'd have faith that Mulroney could do it effectively if communication with Yakabuski is good.Hopefully Prichard takes along Leslie Woo with him as well. I have nothing against him per se, but he did himself a favor because Ford would've given him the axe regardless, seeing as he's most likely going to do a clean sweep of all the executives at Government of Ontario's arms length agencies.
Woo on the other land needs to take a hike; her rationale on various planning decisions have been questionable to say the least.
Interestingly, Metrolinx actually got pretty far on the design of additional tracks under Union. General station plans were produced along with renderings. Vision was for 4 tracks under Union, costing around $900 million.
Leslie Woo is a major problem to where we are today and should have been shown the door years ago.
Montreal has really swung behind REM, for all its faults, as it's now a 'world model' to do these things using P3 models (DBFOM, etc). The devil is in the details, however, and the Crosslinx suit with Metrolinx might render a lot of sensitive issues bare if it goes to court.
I'm in complete agreement, given her signature on some documents that should have never been approved. But are there specific cases (e.g. Hydrail, Presto, Union revitalization, etc.) where she was the initiator of bad ideas? I'm just wondering what role she had specifically that merits her being singled out.
"For all it's faults"...I'm absolutely no fan of REM, as anyone who reads the VIA sting would know. I've posted scathing articles and links, and used the term "seized" for the Mount Royal Tunnel, but I completely stand behind my gist: In the absence of government coffers financing (let alone being able to finance) the many begging needs of transit in this nation, private venture capital will have to fill the void. Whether one likes it or not, there's little choice on this.REM is a prime example of all the pitfalls of privatized transport:
The "silo"/lack of integration resulting from having a stand-alone corporation for a transit line means that:
- An invaluable existing public asset (Mont Royale tunnel) was more or less given away to a pension fund, which could be sold if the REM is not profitable.
- Transit routes will be gerrymandered to avoid competition because of the need to guarantee a profit (there is a non-competition clause will force bus routes to feed the REM instead of taking the most direct route to where people want to go
- The line tries do everything, even when the transport demand could be better met by other services (e.g. the city had already built a station shell and a corridor for an airport train, but instead the REM is building an indirect tunnel);
- Connections to the rest of the system are downplayed or even ignored (the original REM proposal did not have connections to any of the metro lines, despite crossing all three of them); and
- The performance of the system as a whole is sacrificed for the performance of a single line (e.g. the use of an uninteroperable technology cutting off direct access to downtown, the creation of new transfers)
(Please forgive me for lecturing, since I know I'm preaching to the choir)
As @steveintoronto and other posters have pointed out, Union station already has an abundance of tracks. Union was originally designed in the 1920s to handle freight traffic, intercity traffic (which was of a significantly greater volume than today) and mail,
which all required long dwells for loading/unloading. All that track/platform space could be put to better use now through modernisation of operations:
Through-Running
Toronto is very lucky in that its Union station literally does unite all its passenger lines, through a surface alignment. Other cities have spent collosal amounts of money to connect disjointed terminals through downtown (e.g. Paris with RER, London with Crossrail), or have proposals to do the same (e.g. Boston, NYC).
However, Toronto does not take advantage of this, instead using track space in the most space-constrained part of the corridor to turn around trains, requiring time-consuming brake checks. Instead of terminating the trains at Union, if they continued on east/west, you would need fewer platforms and be able to reach a greater range of destinations (e.g. direct from Oakville to Pickering) without an unnecessary transfer.
What is mindbogglingly shortsighted is that Metrolinx has actually proposed to truncate some GO lines just short of downtown, requiring users to transfer for the last two kilometers or so, spending millions of dollars to create a problem that more forward-thinking cities are spending billions to fix.
Reducing Dwell time
Metrolinx's extremely flawed electrification study assumed that they would run GO in the exact same way (with infrequent bilevels, just with a different mode of propulsion.) Rather than have enormous double decker trains that require long dwell times to board/alight passengers through their few doors and stairs, they should take a cue from the subway network (which handles many times the number of passengers despite smaller trains) and have more doors and level boarding.
Switching to single level trains and high platforms would significantly reduce dwell time, improve the reliability of the schedule, and allow GO to make significantly better use of limited platform space.
TLDR:
Instead of spending several billion dollars (let's be honest, there's no way they're building a four-track GO tunnel that deep below Union for less than a billion dollars) they would be better off investing in:
- Pairing up GO lines and through-routing them
- Rationalizing routes to avoid unnecessary track switching (with some flyovers)
- Moving from bi-levels to single level EMUs and level boarding
- Modernizing signalling
- Electrifying
I'm in complete agreement, given her signature on some documents that should have never been approved. But are there specific cases (e.g. Hydrail, Presto, Union revitalization, etc.) where she was the initiator of bad ideas? I'm just wondering what role she had specifically that merits her being singled out.
REM is a prime example of all the pitfalls of privatized transport:
The "silo"/lack of integration resulting from having a stand-alone corporation for a transit line means that:
- An invaluable existing public asset (Mont Royale tunnel) was more or less given away to a pension fund, which could be sold if the REM is not profitable.
- Transit routes will be gerrymandered to avoid competition because of the need to guarantee a profit (there is a non-competition clause will force bus routes to feed the REM instead of taking the most direct route to where people want to go
- The line tries do everything, even when the transport demand could be better met by other services (e.g. the city had already built a station shell and a corridor for an airport train, but instead the REM is building an indirect tunnel);
- Connections to the rest of the system are downplayed or even ignored (the original REM proposal did not have connections to any of the metro lines, despite crossing all three of them); and
- The performance of the system as a whole is sacrificed for the performance of a single line (e.g. the use of an uninteroperable technology cutting off direct access to downtown, the creation of new transfers)