When we find a host country that wants them and are ready to keep them there a while. Right now there's no real need for them. And there's capable platforms, from allies, in theatre already.
Also, going forward, we'll need a whole discussion on the value of heavy armour for Canada. Very hard to deploy them. A much more limited use case, due to increasing vulnerability to anti-tank weapons. There's a reason the US Marine Corps is ditching tanks entirely. We'll need to have a lot of doctrinal review after this conflict. And also a new foreign and defence policy before plonking down billions in new spending.
First and foremost, I would welcome a Foreign and Defence Policy-led review of required force structures any day of the week. Normally it is Treasury led (how much money do have left over from bribing the taxpayer...).
But a reminder that Canada currently has a battlegroup as part of Operation REASSURANCE in Latvia as part of NATO's Enhance Forward Presence in the Baltic states and Poland. If Canada wishes to play a role in operations like this then perhaps re-examining our armoured capability to two battlegroups with MBTs, IFVs and armoured SP guns may be the way forward. It may be a posture of committing forces in the context of high intensity armoured/mechanised warfare, or it may not. And the utility of armoured vehicles and MBTs were found also in Bosnia, 1992-95. The Canadian 1950s era M113 were shockingly poor in comparison to the British Warrior (1980s era). And UK Warriors, US Bradleys and other IFVs (e.g. CV9030s) were also deployed in context of Afghanistan. Conventional war, hostile peacekeeping and COIN. Three for the price of one.
We've been going around this buoy since 1991, and the discussion goes on but the utility of the main battle tank, as part of an all arms capability, remains.
The tank is dead. Long live the tank.
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