Like how much more expressions do they need??? They have the plans and the studies have been done over and over again. Time to launch the actual procurement process instead of this pre pre pre procurement.I just received the following email from the HFR Project Team which includes a link to their new website:
This is the normal procurement project for this type of thing. They're really complicated contracts, and the processes take a long time.Like how much more expressions do they need??? They have the plans and the studies have been done over and over again. Time to launch the actual procurement process instead of this pre pre pre procurement.
Could be an issue with securing track time. Or trying to preserve cash. The same thing is happening in the corridor.Via Rail silent on full return of Sudbury - White River train line
Northern Ontario tourism operators say Via Rail is reneging on its promise to return a passenger line between Sudbury and White River back to its full schedule.northernontario.ctvnews.ca
You make some good arguments, but is this incapacity/incompetence common for governments in general, or just common for the US/UK/Canadian governments and SOEs since the Reagan/Thatcher/Mulroney era?You’re thinking a bit too narrowly. This project is about as extensive of a P3 as you can get.
P3s pick from a menu of items:
Design
Build
Finance
Operate
Maintain
Own
Transfer
Three main reasons for doing P3s. Optimizing projects in a way that is rare for governments to be able to do. Transferring risk (cost overruns, new technology, delays). Cost discovery (lock in and know up front cost over 30, 50 years).
The objective is since the winner makes money from building, operating and maintaining, that they can better optimize among all three to find the ‘best price’. It also ensures enough maintenance is done (government is bad at this).
A government may design to ensure low enough upfront cost at a higher operating and maintenance costs—not because they want to but because the project has a hard budget cap.
A government typically wouldn’t take a technological risk even if there is a good chance at huge maintenance and or operational savings. There is also assigning a price to various risks (geotechnical, design) so they’re known up front. Can also transfer things like demand risk (ensure project isn’t compromised in ways which reduce demand—or ensure project isn’t a white elephant).
Cost discovery is another one. A risk world wide has been lines being built and the original economic models being way optimistic. So you set a minimum service level, and ask for subsidy needed to pay for it. Then you know up front. the great thing is the builder can make decisions a government would rarely do. Like add way more service speculatively. Deep discounting to build a market. Spend more money to make a service faster because it will generate more demand. Making choices that lead to large early losses to support future profits.
The liberals made a deal with the NDP to stay in power until 2025 so hopefully we can make some progress between now and then.
In general. Socialist, centrist, right wing, they all do it. Maintenance is hard to justify to voters. Some of the biggest P3 users were/are left wing French and Italian governments.ou make some good arguments, but is this incapacity/incompetence common for governments in general, or just common for the US/UK/Canadian governments and SOEs since the Reagan/Thatcher/Mulroney era?
Each optimize. Then the top two or three go into 'competitive dialog', basically working through each to optimize further.With bidding consortia, its highly likely that the best outcome won't be available, because rather than selecting the best option in each area, the owner must choose from the available combinations. For example with GO Expansion if Alstom has the best equipment offering but SNCF the best operating plan that isn't one of the choices.
Ottawa unfortunately doesn't operate the LRT, so there are misaligned incentives. If going around curves at speed is causing damage, an integrated P3 would reoptimize and decide to either take the performance payment penalty (going slower), make capital upgrades at their own expense to fulfill original specs, or find another solution. Instead, you have operators whose union wants the P3 to fail likely not being the most flexible of workforce.However, throwing rolling stock into the mix certainly hasn't helped the Ottawa LRT
They are known risks, and they can price those risks. Then the government can decide eyes open whether to go ahead or not. And that is the point, profit motive is there to try to price as accurately as possible. Whereas a government might balk at paying consultants to figure out these risks, each consortium gets to. In effect, the government gets multiple teams to price the risk, for free or close to free.it seems as though far too many of the external revenue factors and drivers would be just as much beyond the control of anyone managing this on VIA's behalf as they are beyond VIA's control now, resulting in some risks that are very hard to accurately price
You know what would be good for developing a talent base: a 30 year contract.Meanwhile Amtrak, VIA and pre-privatization BR are continually hamstrung in operating and planning by short-term political decision making. That in turn contributes to not being able to recruit, develop and maintain talent, because good people get fed up with that nonsense and move on
Canada runs 6.48 million tonnes of cargo on average over each km of rail. France? 1.18 million. Germany 1.74 million, UK 0.6 million.What are European railway SOEs doing differently at the governance level that empowers them to be successful? It takes more than just a better level of funding.
It's pretty clear from Alon Levy's work that there's more than just Freight vs Passenger conflict here.In general. Socialist, centrist, right wing, they all do it. Maintenance is hard to justify to voters. Some of the biggest P3 users were/are left wing French and Italian governments.
Each optimize. Then the top two or three go into 'competitive dialog', basically working through each to optimize further.
And you point out a key benefit: the government who is offering a P3 has to lay out all the performance characteristics that are minimum service standards, and identify ones where higher performance earns a higher point score. Instead of conventional contracting where you trust on the government to have done an internal optimization upfront.
Ottawa unfortunately doesn't operate the LRT, so there are misaligned incentives. If going around curves at speed is causing damage, an integrated P3 would reoptimize and decide to either take the performance payment penalty (going slower), make capital upgrades at their own expense to fulfill original specs, or find another solution. Instead, you have operators whose union wants the P3 to fail likely not being the most flexible of workforce.
They are known risks, and they can price those risks. Then the government can decide eyes open whether to go ahead or not. And that is the point, profit motive is there to try to price as accurately as possible. Whereas a government might balk at paying consultants to figure out these risks, each consortium gets to. In effect, the government gets multiple teams to price the risk, for free or close to free.
You know what would be good for developing a talent base: a 30 year contract.
Canada runs 6.48 million tonnes of cargo on average over each km of rail. France? 1.18 million. Germany 1.74 million, UK 0.6 million.
I'm always conflicted by this. I hate that our passenger rail is hampered by freight, but at the same time I'm glad we ship so much by rail. We need to do even more of it, and electrify the freight networks.Canada runs 6.48 million tonnes of cargo on average over each km of rail. France? 1.18 million. Germany 1.74 million, UK 0.6 million.
Alon doesn't think P3s are a good way to deliver transit. Full stop. Not familiar with much from him other than his tendency to draw fantasy maps and provide high level cost analysis.It's pretty clear from Alon Levy's work that there's more than just Freight vs Passenger conflict here.
My interpretation of his main findings thus far are basically:Alon doesn't think P3s are a good way to deliver transit. Full stop. Not familiar with much from him other than his tendency to draw fantasy maps and provide high level cost analysis.
4. Operational improvements are cheaper than infrastructure improvements.
All are good points but I think the first one is the most important key to understanding why so many North American transit projects go off the rails. This can be seen in the now classic example of the suboptimal design decisions forced onto the Ottawa LRT and even in the ongoing saga of the Washington metro system's recent difficulties with operating a frequent service without derailments. Buying off the shelf parts and systems won't keep a project on track if the buyer doesn't know what they need.1. State capacity matters. Government doesn't actually need to do the construction itself, but they need to have the internal expertise to be involved in design, and closely supervise construction, otherwise they get taken for a ride.