The majority (Côté and Brown JJ. (Wagner C.J.C. and Moldaver and Rowe JJ. concurring)) held that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that constructive taking requires that land be actually taken from an owner and acquired by the state. According to the majority, a “beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it” (the first part of the CPR test) does not require the state to actually acquire a proprietary interest. Rather, it is enough if the state, in effect, obtains an advantage from the property (at para 38).
An “advantage” could be demonstrated by, for example, permanent or indefinite denial of access to the property; the government’s permanent or indefinite occupation of the property; regulations that leave a rights holder with only notional use of the land, deprived of all economic value; or confining the uses of private land to public purposes, such as conservation, recreation, or institutional uses such as parks, schools, or municipal buildings (at para 45). However, the majority cautioned that not every regulation over the use of property amounts to a constructive taking. Governments and municipalities can validly regulate land in the public interest without effecting “takings” (at para 19).