Lennox970
Active Member
I have just read the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) - Intelligence Outlook 2025. https://fe-ddis.dk/en/produkter/Risk_assessment/riskassessment/intelligence-outlook-2025/
This makes for fascinating reading, and it does question what Denmark's plan is to defend this vast territory and its associated waters (aside from wishful thinking). Setting Trump and the US aside, it is entirely reasonable that a key planning assumption is that outside non-traditional powers may/will be taking an interest in the region in the coming decades, and a reasonably resourced plan to defend/mitigate this possibility is the responsibility of the sovereign power: Denmark. Without defence, there may be a (as yet undefinable) risk to other High North powers' (Canada, US) territory and equities in the region.
"In recent years, the United States has significantly increased its security policy focus on the Arctic, while Russia continues its military build-up, and China continues to develop its capacity to operate both submarines and surface vessels in the region." (p. 30)
- "Russia remains the strongest military power in the Arctic but sees itself as being challenged by the West. As a result, Russia will increasingly assert its interests through a more confrontational approach, both politically and militarily." (p. 30)
- "Most of Russia’s nuclear-armed submarines are stationed in the Arctic. They form a key component of Russia’s plan to deter the United States from attacking, providing Russia with the capability to launch a potential retaliatory nuclear strike." (p. 31)
- "The United States’ assessment of the scale and nature of future Chinese military activity in the Arctic is a key factor shaping its engagement in the region. Any Chinese military activity in the Arctic – particularly in proximity to US territory – would be regarded as a serious concern." (p. 31)
- "China aims to develop the capacity for independent military operations in the Arctic. Chinese activities are primarily concentrated in the waters north of the Bering Strait, extending towards the North Pole." (p. 35)
- "China’s long-term goal is to deploy missile submarines beneath the ice, thereby attaining the same nuclear second-strike capability as Russia and the United States." (p. 36)
- "Although Chinese companies have shown interest in investing in Greenland, this has so far not produced tangible results. Nevertheless, China’s long-term Arctic interests include Greenland, and it is expected to continue pursuing cooperation with Greenland, particularly in research but also in commercial ventures." (p. 36)
- "Despite the considerable geographical distance, Russia periodically deploys submarines, surface vessels and aircraft near both Greenland and the Faroe Islands, as well as throughout the waters between them." (p. 38)- "In addition, Russia employs civilian vessels operating in the area to carry out tasks such as surveillance on behalf of the Russian state." (p. 38)
- "For Russia, the waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the United Kingdom – the so-called GIUK Gap – form the main maritime gateway to and from the Arctic. Thus, the GIUK Gap is vital for Russia in the event of an armed conflict with NATO." (p. 35)
- "In such a conflict, Russia would seek to disrupt the supply lines between the United States and Europe by deploying attack submarines capable of transiting the GIUK Gap undetected." (p. 35)
This makes for fascinating reading, and it does question what Denmark's plan is to defend this vast territory and its associated waters (aside from wishful thinking). Setting Trump and the US aside, it is entirely reasonable that a key planning assumption is that outside non-traditional powers may/will be taking an interest in the region in the coming decades, and a reasonably resourced plan to defend/mitigate this possibility is the responsibility of the sovereign power: Denmark. Without defence, there may be a (as yet undefinable) risk to other High North powers' (Canada, US) territory and equities in the region.
"In recent years, the United States has significantly increased its security policy focus on the Arctic, while Russia continues its military build-up, and China continues to develop its capacity to operate both submarines and surface vessels in the region." (p. 30)
- "Russia remains the strongest military power in the Arctic but sees itself as being challenged by the West. As a result, Russia will increasingly assert its interests through a more confrontational approach, both politically and militarily." (p. 30)
- "Most of Russia’s nuclear-armed submarines are stationed in the Arctic. They form a key component of Russia’s plan to deter the United States from attacking, providing Russia with the capability to launch a potential retaliatory nuclear strike." (p. 31)
- "The United States’ assessment of the scale and nature of future Chinese military activity in the Arctic is a key factor shaping its engagement in the region. Any Chinese military activity in the Arctic – particularly in proximity to US territory – would be regarded as a serious concern." (p. 31)
- "China aims to develop the capacity for independent military operations in the Arctic. Chinese activities are primarily concentrated in the waters north of the Bering Strait, extending towards the North Pole." (p. 35)
- "China’s long-term goal is to deploy missile submarines beneath the ice, thereby attaining the same nuclear second-strike capability as Russia and the United States." (p. 36)
- "Although Chinese companies have shown interest in investing in Greenland, this has so far not produced tangible results. Nevertheless, China’s long-term Arctic interests include Greenland, and it is expected to continue pursuing cooperation with Greenland, particularly in research but also in commercial ventures." (p. 36)
- "Despite the considerable geographical distance, Russia periodically deploys submarines, surface vessels and aircraft near both Greenland and the Faroe Islands, as well as throughout the waters between them." (p. 38)- "In addition, Russia employs civilian vessels operating in the area to carry out tasks such as surveillance on behalf of the Russian state." (p. 38)
- "For Russia, the waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the United Kingdom – the so-called GIUK Gap – form the main maritime gateway to and from the Arctic. Thus, the GIUK Gap is vital for Russia in the event of an armed conflict with NATO." (p. 35)
- "In such a conflict, Russia would seek to disrupt the supply lines between the United States and Europe by deploying attack submarines capable of transiting the GIUK Gap undetected." (p. 35)
