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Metrolinx: UK Madrid Tour Report

Some great lessons-learned, although I'd expect that Rob MacIssac and everyone else at Metrolinx would already know the bulk of this. Here are quotes that I find particularly useful and hope are adopted into the GTTA/Metrolinx daily thought-processes:

"(c) Although not entirely transferable due to the differences in population density and land-values, the Hong Kong transportation authority’s sale of “air rights†over and near terminals was cited as an example of a large proportion of transit operating costs being off-set by capturing value created by public infrastructure investment in transportation;
(d) An examination of the concept of the “voluntary contribution agreementâ€, which was a device used successfully in Copenhagen’s Orestad project, yielding UK £980M in revenues;"

These two points explain the value of linking development to transportation planning. In particular, it demonstrates the short-sightedness of GO and other transit operators from conducting their business in the proverbial vacuum. Development and transit-planning are hand-in-hand; Metrolinx needs to adopt transit-oriented development principles and really be given the opportunity to influence station-area development. The challenges of this are evident, especially in a situation like Toronto where the TTC is insanely offbase with its view of "air rights"; TEDCO and other city agencies also have antiquated views of how to do their business.

The quote below illustrates how the public sector shouldn't go at it along. Indeed, public investments have proven to yield amazing results for nearby sites in North American as well, take a look:

"In Greater London, it was suggested that the value of privately owned residential properties had grown by 10-20% as a direct result of new rapid-transit infrastructure. One practical caution was the experience that voluntary contribution agreements were said to work best for fixed infrastructure (e.g., stations, rail lines, BRT fixed infrastructure, ferry docks), but not for discretionary services subject to policy changes.
E.5 Successful regional transportation authorities commonly had independent, transportation-dedicated sources of revenues upon which to rely in developing their long-term plans and in enlisting private-sector and pension-fund investors. As with the voluntary contribution agreements referenced above, dedicated revenues were seen as a more effective measure to stabilize investor confidence, by insulating longer-term or risk-affected investments from periodic subsequent governmental policy shifts."

Here it is discovered that success is directly tied to a robust and flexible approach to investing. This means that transit needs to be the goal but unconventional methods/ideas should be utilized. Investors, by nature, are risk-adverse so the public sector has the responsibility for taking the first plunge, so to speak.

And if the GTTA really wants to be a regional focus they need to understand that regional commuting patterns are not completely driven by the Union Station in and out pattern. Rather, other major "hubs" exist in the system and are better served by highways than transit. I believe that this is well recognized (look at the Growth Plan, 2006 for proof) but also look at Madrid's response to its similar problems:

"In Madrid, the challenges arising from rapid suburban growth and improved transportation corridors had been a tendency to have large volumes of passenger and commercial traffic move toward the centre of the urban area, despite the presence of “ring†roads. The metropolitan authorities determined that a key ingredient in reducing congestion was to reduce single-passenger vehicle and bus traffic traveling to the centre of the urban area that did not have the city core as their final destination. As in the GTHA, the patterns of commuting have evolved from a hub-and-spoke, morning-in, evening-out pattern, to one of increasing all-day, cross-network commuting and commercial traffic.

F.6 As a result, the Madrid authorities designated a series of “gateway†facilities at the end of the transportation corridors in the near-suburbs or at the edge of the city core, for up-grading to a full multi-modal transportation hub. Typically built around pre-existing railway or bus terminals or major subway stations, these multi-modal hubs were designed to afford passenger traffic with an opportunity to transfer to other modes of transportation conveniently and generally using the same fare-media. This had the effect of siphoning-off the absolute volume of passenger-traffic vehicles competing for road-space with commercial vehicles, as well distributing passenger traffic in a way that ensured a quicker elapsed trip time, a key ingredient in influencing the choice between using transit and a car."

This kind of long-term thinking is lost in our current political climate. Metrolinx/GTTA needs to fill the void and be given the authority to actually commence such long-term thinking to achieve its goals; especially if it is political viable for all orders of government to take credit for incremental success (regardless of who pays and who is in office at any time in the life-span of regional transportation revilatization).

My last comment is this: move on from studying other systems and improve the one you've inherited.
 
Although not entirely transferable due to the differences in population density and land-values, the Hong Kong transportation authority’s sale of “air rights†over and near terminals was cited as an example of a large proportion of transit operating costs being off-set by capturing value created by public infrastructure investment in transportation

Hong Kong's subway operator MTR (there is no such thing as the 'Hong Kong transportation authority' as the city's transit system is run by private companies) does not sell air rights over and near terminals - it is the developer of the air rights (in almost all cases in partner with another major developer). MTR has its own property management arm that manages many of the high-rise residential towers and shopping malls that it has developed.
 
I found the part about subway construction interesting.

Interestingly, the Madrid public transportation (subway) infrastructure achievements (1995-2007) were financed by a level of investment (C$10.7B) similar to the value of the Ontario Government’s own-share commitment to Move Ontario 2020 (C$11.5B). In just twelve years, that level of investment in Madrid produced nearly 150 kms. of subway lines and 120 subway stations, at a per kilometre cost of less than C$90M/km.

...

In addition to the obvious advantage to the taxpayer and lower public debt obligations, Madrid’s ability to reduce costs allowed it to favour subways over LRT and BRT in urban settings, and to build subways (and LRT / BRT) at an accelerated rate, over the course of two decades.

And how'd they achieve such a low per kilometre cost for subway? Read on!

How was this performance achieved? The answer appeared to a combination of favourable factors, some of which were natural advantages (e.g., soil conditions) but many due to sound, efficient decision-making and following a comprehensive, priority-based strategy. By setting out very ambitious multi-year financing and construction plans, major technological investments in tunnel-building were amortized early and over large projects.

This appeared to have allowed major capital equipment (such as expensive tunnel boring machinery) to be used more economically over time and over other projects. In the specific case of tunnel-boring equipment, additional machinery was then acquired due to the savings, for a compounding effect as it, too, was amortized. At the time of the Study Tour’s visit, Madrid had an estimated 41 boring machines in operation, including some 30 that were used at one point in subway construction.

Subway construction was done on an uninterrupted, continuous-bore basis, year-in, year-out. Since the boring equipment technology used by Madrid can be operated with very few workers, once the equipment itself was amortized, there was little reason to discontinue its use, even if labour costs involved shift-work and overtime. To avoid adverse impacts on neighbourhoods and commercial enterprises, as well as to avoid buried utilities and structural foundations, tunnel-boring was done at a very deep level.

So the solution is not to build just an isolated subway somewhere. We need to build many subway lines, and continuously, over a couple decades. So we should finish Sheppard, replace the SRT, expand Yonge past Steeles, Spadina to VCC, Bloor to MCC, Eglinton, DRL, and possibly more. We might not need THIRTY (30) tunnel boring machines, but we should take a hint and see that the more we build, the bigger the cost savings because you're amortizing thei initial costs over a longer period of continuous construction. Assuming we can get that to work here.
 
^^Good luck! We will NEVER have an expansive, highly interconnected and efficient subway system.

Political will. Intelligence. Foresight. Ambition. Motivation to create change. Planning skills, etc.

Only some of the things lacking, when I think about our politicians.

p5
 
Interesting. I had heard that about Madrid's boring machines; ones you put them in the ground, they just keep on digging.

I was just in Madrid for a few days; the extent of infrastructure development there is really staggering. It's easily the best metro system I have ever been on. The best part? A ten-ride ticket is €6.60.

Edit: the interesting thing about Madrid is that it's actually quite similar to Toronto. The populations are almost exactly the same--±3M in the city proper and 6 in the metro--and like TO huge swathes of Madrid were built post-1945. And both are struggling to cope with unbelievable suburban development at the same time as the inner city gets substantially renewed. I would love to see some of MAD's lessons applied in TO.
 
I think a key lesson here is the adoption of a unified fare payment system.

Accoridng to Appendix C, prior to the huge expansion of their subway, the introduction of the travel card netted a 31% increase in riders.

Wow.

Why is it that we can't even take that basic step?
 
You're completely right, Earlscourt. If we had an integrated zone fare system with the 905, I would expect a ridersip increase of at least 25% overnight.

I've finally realized what a fad "light rail" has become, and I think that's poisoning planning in a lot of places. Rather than being looked at as one of several modes that is most suitable in some areas (downtown neigbourhood networks and suburban feeder corridors), it's seen as a panacea for everything. It hit me when I was reading a letter to the editor in a New York paper from a transit "advocate" attacking the Second Avenue Subway. "Why are we going with obsolete 20th century subway technology when progressive cities all around the world are choosing advanced, 21st century light rail." It's just like all those maglev/LIM/monorail transit systems that were so fashionable and would solve every problem back in the 70s. It's not about serving riders. It's about being "modern" and "progressive."
 
It hit me when I was reading a letter to the editor in a New York paper from a transit "advocate" attacking the Second Avenue Subway. "Why are we going with obsolete 20th century subway technology when progressive cities all around the world are choosing advanced, 21st century light rail."

No... freakin... way. Seriously? 2nd Avenue Subway as a light rail line instead? I shudder at the thought. There's so much that's absurd about that thought I won't even start.

Subways are 20th century? Will someone PLEASE explain to me why so many North Americans are incapable of looking at what's happening beyond North America. It's not as if it's difficult or something.

Anyone who attacks a plan not because of service or quality, not because of speed or capacity, not because of design or location, but because it's "old technology" needs to be ignored and dismissed immediately.
 
You're completely right, Earlscourt. If we had an integrated zone fare system with the 905, I would expect a ridersip increase of at least 25% overnight.

That 25% increase would be at a cost in the low millions, which is much more achievable than subways, lrt, or rapidbus expansion and construction. Nevermind the increase in fares recieved would more than offset the cost of implementation.

I agree with you as regards light rail, I think it is the darling of transit afficiandos for the moment. It has a place, but that place isn't everywhere.
 
Im really curious, I mean, Metrolinx going to Madrid to study subway construction. I know we have two extensions in the pipeline, but you would have to think that Metrolinx may favour the addition of a couple of new lines.

Especially with the talk of this bore technology. Cut and cover (or whatever it is called) is a long arduous process if I understand correctly, and disrupts business and such too much. Then there was the point about ammortizing the cost of the bores at the beginning of the project (ie. Spadina and Yonge extensions) and then having them continue to dig year round.
 
I've always wondered why subway construction did not proceed like that in Madrid. Forgetting about how many machines you have. Why don't you just set aside a fund in the capital budget to bore continuously? Drop in the expensive stations when you get the funding but just have ol'Betsy down there digging away inch-by-inch day-after-day. So while the politicians fight over funding and regulations and studies you'll be modestly tunnelling many km's every year.
 
Drop in the expensive stations when you get the funding but just have ol'Betsy down there digging away inch-by-inch day-after-day.

It might have something to do with environmental assessment requirements being different there. I expect if you wanted to just let the borers tunnel underground here, you'd need some manner of blanket EA for the entire GTA, which I doubt would get approved.

Perhaps someone more knowlegdeable about EAs could clarify that?
 
It's kind of funny how in the time we spend studying the "do nothing" option for EAs, Madrid could get an entire line finished.
 

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