Glen
Senior Member
http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=956352
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While the G20 is keen on hammering out a new financial order for the 21st-century global economy, one of the key elements of the original Bretton Woods Agreement is unlikely to get more than a passing glance -- currencies.
The cornerstone of Bretton Woods was a fixed exchange rate system designed to prevent the "beggar-thy-neighbour" currency devaluations that wreaked havoc on the global economy in the 1930s. The system broke down in the 1970s, and currencies have been the Achilles heel of the global economy ever since.
Today is no exception. While presidents and prime ministers get set to tinker with new global regulations and promise to pour more stimulus into a beaten-down global economy, the 10,000-pound dragon in the summit room will surely be China's insistence on maintaining a weak currency to boost export growth, and the bulging war chest of foreign exchange reserves around the world.
China, its BRIC brothers -- Brazil, Russia, India -- and other emerging powers may have won a seat at the summit table but the global economy has still not figured how to absorb their growing might without major disruption.
The problem is one of the trickiest and long-standing of global economics: How to encourage countries to allow their currencies to appreciate as their economies mature.
"One of the greatest events in the history of economic development is occurring -- the emergence of the BRIC economies with some three-billion people," wrote Martin Murenbeeld, chief economist of the DundeeWealth Inc. in a recent report. "And it is being [largely] handled with rigid exchange rates. Such a dramatic development requires maximum price flexibility so that the world economy can absorb the "shock" as best as possible."
The immediate cause of the current financial crisis is well known. Financial institutions stocked up on vast quantities of subprime mortgage debt and other related debt securities through the U.S. housing boom of the early 2000s.
As the housing bubble burst, many of those securities became worthless, causing a huge drain on bank balance sheets which, in turn, clogged up transmission of credit around the world.
But the crisis has its roots in the huge financial imbalances that have built up around the world.
Although the U.S. Federal Reserve tried to drive up interest rates as the economy recovered from the tech wreck through 2004, it found it had lost "all control" over its ability to influence longer-term U.S. treasury rates, explained Alan Greenspan during an appearance in Toronto last week.
Despite a growing U.S. and global economy, and rising short-term rates, long-term interest rates remained inordinately low among many developed economies.
Mr. Greenspan, the former Fed chairman, famously called the problem a "conundrum," but that conundrum played a key role in both fueling the U.S. housing bubble and inducing financial institutions to create ever-more complicated and risky credit instruments for investors hungry for yield.
One of the reasons yields were so low was simple: China and other emerging markets were voraciously buying up U.S. treasuries and mortgage-backed securities and selling yuan, Hong Kong and Singapore dollars in order to keep their own currencies weak and exports humming -- the time-honoured mercantilist approach to economic development.
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