kEiThZ
Superstar
This article raises some good issues about the challenges the Liberals face if they want to call an election:
PUBLICATION: GLOBE AND MAIL
IDN: 091070165
DATE: 2009.04.17
PAGE: A15 (ILLUS)
BYLINE: TOM FLANAGAN
SECTION: Comment
EDITION: Metro
DATELINE:
WORDS: 756
WORD COUNT: 766
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LIBERAL STRATEGY Whistling up the coalition from the dead Michael Ignatieff can't force an election alone. He needs the socialists and separatists
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TOM FLANAGAN Professor of political science at the University of Calgary and a former Conservative campaign manager The Liberals are feeling frisky. Last week, a "close adviser" of Michael Ignatieff told Le Devoir the chances were greater than 90 per cent that the Liberals would force an election this fall.
That seems like a favourable time frame for Mr. Ignatieff. Although some economic indicators suggest that the recession has bottomed out, unemployment will continue growing for at least two more quarters and may well be at its worst by next fall. Maybe that's why Mr.
Ignatieff is now publicly musing about reforms to employment insurance.
Making EI the main issue at a time when unemployment is at its peak might be a winning strategy. In any case, it could make voters forget that Mr. Ignatieff not only supported the Conservative budget but has adopted other Conservative policies, such as no bailout for the Vancouver Olympics, support for Alberta's oil sands, dumping the Liberals' carbon tax and ending the combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011.
There is, however, a big obstacle in the way: Mr. Ignatieff can't force an election by himself. He needs the votes of the New Democrats and the Bloc Quebecois to defeat the Conservatives on a vote of no-confidence. In other words, he has to reactivate the coalition with the socialists and separatists against which Canadians reacted so strongly last fall.
NDP strategists have practical reasons to be wary of such a ploy.
In the last election, they are said to have spent almost as much as the Conservatives. Can the Dippers afford another election campaign just a year later? And why would they rush into an election if the polls suggest the Liberals are going to do well? The NDP had its best results in 1988, when the Liberals were at a low point. In the six elections starting in 1993, the result has always been the same: When the Liberals go up, the NDP goes down, and vice versa. Jack Layton has worked hard in three campaigns to build up his party's caucus from 13 members when he became leader to 37 after the 2008 election.
Will he risk those gains trying to put in power a Liberal leader who mirrors the Conservative leader on so many major issues? The Bloc may also balk at an early election. Money is not the problem; since the Bloquistes operate only in Quebec, their campaign costs are so low that they can live off the federal subsidy without worrying about fundraising. But if the Liberal vote goes up in Quebec, the Bloc could lose seats in the Montreal area. It might compensate by picking up Conservative seats around Quebec City; but that's not a sure thing, because most of those seats are held by well-entrenched incumbents who might win re-election on their individual reputations.
So, as with the NDP, what would the Bloc hope to gain by forcing an early election? Gilles Duceppe might do better by trying to extract concessions in the fall fiscal update. Amidst the stimulus shower, Canadian voters will hardly notice some extra drops falling on Quebec if that is the price of avoiding another election.
If his coalition partners prove to be reluctant, Mr. Ignatieff may have to offer inducements. The big one would be participation in a ruling coalition after the election; lesser ones might include specific policies that the Liberals would pledge to enact if they formed the government. But such offers would make Mr. Ignatieff even more vulnerable to attack for whistling up the coalition from the dead.
And he is, indeed, vulnerable. He did not exorcise the coalition's ghost when he broke ranks with his erstwhile partners this winter to support Jim Flaherty's budget. There is the little matter of Mr. Ignatieff's signature on the coalition agreement, around which a whole suite of Conservative ads could be designed.
Mr. Ignatieff, moreover, sealed the deal on Nov. 30 when he played host to the other Liberal leadership contenders, Bob Rae and Dominic LeBlanc, at his Yorkville condominium. Despite some misgivings, the three announced their support for the coalition. Had Mr. Ignatieff decided to oppose it, the deal would have been dead. As Brian Mulroney famously said to John Turner, "You had an option, sir . . ." Bottom line: Mr. Ignatieff needs to resurrect the coalition to get an early election, but if he does so, he risks giving the Conservatives a big stick to beat him with.
PUBLICATION: GLOBE AND MAIL
IDN: 091070165
DATE: 2009.04.17
PAGE: A15 (ILLUS)
BYLINE: TOM FLANAGAN
SECTION: Comment
EDITION: Metro
DATELINE:
WORDS: 756
WORD COUNT: 766
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIBERAL STRATEGY Whistling up the coalition from the dead Michael Ignatieff can't force an election alone. He needs the socialists and separatists
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOM FLANAGAN Professor of political science at the University of Calgary and a former Conservative campaign manager The Liberals are feeling frisky. Last week, a "close adviser" of Michael Ignatieff told Le Devoir the chances were greater than 90 per cent that the Liberals would force an election this fall.
That seems like a favourable time frame for Mr. Ignatieff. Although some economic indicators suggest that the recession has bottomed out, unemployment will continue growing for at least two more quarters and may well be at its worst by next fall. Maybe that's why Mr.
Ignatieff is now publicly musing about reforms to employment insurance.
Making EI the main issue at a time when unemployment is at its peak might be a winning strategy. In any case, it could make voters forget that Mr. Ignatieff not only supported the Conservative budget but has adopted other Conservative policies, such as no bailout for the Vancouver Olympics, support for Alberta's oil sands, dumping the Liberals' carbon tax and ending the combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011.
There is, however, a big obstacle in the way: Mr. Ignatieff can't force an election by himself. He needs the votes of the New Democrats and the Bloc Quebecois to defeat the Conservatives on a vote of no-confidence. In other words, he has to reactivate the coalition with the socialists and separatists against which Canadians reacted so strongly last fall.
NDP strategists have practical reasons to be wary of such a ploy.
In the last election, they are said to have spent almost as much as the Conservatives. Can the Dippers afford another election campaign just a year later? And why would they rush into an election if the polls suggest the Liberals are going to do well? The NDP had its best results in 1988, when the Liberals were at a low point. In the six elections starting in 1993, the result has always been the same: When the Liberals go up, the NDP goes down, and vice versa. Jack Layton has worked hard in three campaigns to build up his party's caucus from 13 members when he became leader to 37 after the 2008 election.
Will he risk those gains trying to put in power a Liberal leader who mirrors the Conservative leader on so many major issues? The Bloc may also balk at an early election. Money is not the problem; since the Bloquistes operate only in Quebec, their campaign costs are so low that they can live off the federal subsidy without worrying about fundraising. But if the Liberal vote goes up in Quebec, the Bloc could lose seats in the Montreal area. It might compensate by picking up Conservative seats around Quebec City; but that's not a sure thing, because most of those seats are held by well-entrenched incumbents who might win re-election on their individual reputations.
So, as with the NDP, what would the Bloc hope to gain by forcing an early election? Gilles Duceppe might do better by trying to extract concessions in the fall fiscal update. Amidst the stimulus shower, Canadian voters will hardly notice some extra drops falling on Quebec if that is the price of avoiding another election.
If his coalition partners prove to be reluctant, Mr. Ignatieff may have to offer inducements. The big one would be participation in a ruling coalition after the election; lesser ones might include specific policies that the Liberals would pledge to enact if they formed the government. But such offers would make Mr. Ignatieff even more vulnerable to attack for whistling up the coalition from the dead.
And he is, indeed, vulnerable. He did not exorcise the coalition's ghost when he broke ranks with his erstwhile partners this winter to support Jim Flaherty's budget. There is the little matter of Mr. Ignatieff's signature on the coalition agreement, around which a whole suite of Conservative ads could be designed.
Mr. Ignatieff, moreover, sealed the deal on Nov. 30 when he played host to the other Liberal leadership contenders, Bob Rae and Dominic LeBlanc, at his Yorkville condominium. Despite some misgivings, the three announced their support for the coalition. Had Mr. Ignatieff decided to oppose it, the deal would have been dead. As Brian Mulroney famously said to John Turner, "You had an option, sir . . ." Bottom line: Mr. Ignatieff needs to resurrect the coalition to get an early election, but if he does so, he risks giving the Conservatives a big stick to beat him with.
