Hello everyone. First of all, I want to thank you all for your contributions and discussion throughout the years of this project. Having followed this thread for a long time and recently moved on from the project, I’m finally in a position to share some context. I am a former member of Mobilinx; I’m keeping my specific position private, but I spent enough time on the project to provide some first-hand facts for the group.
Who is Who
The consortium/JV was initially led by Astaldi and Hitachi. Astaldi was responsible for civil and trackworks (via a sub-consortium with Bot and Amico), while Hitachi handled systems and vehicles (supplied by Alstom). PCL was hired for the OMSF building, with IBI Group (now Arcadis) on civil design. Notably, Astaldi was bought out/rescued by Salini Impregilo (forming Webuild) after the contract was awarded, which created significant internal turbulence.
The Bid
During the tender process, only two proposals submitted a price. Other consortia pulled the plug right before submission due to the inherent risks of the project delivery method, the client (Metrolinx), and lessons learned from other projects that were already struggling at the time (e.g., Crosslinx). Even after previous governments trimmed the scope and budget, the price submitted was insufficient. Many items weren't priced to Canadian standards, indirect costs were missed, and the small contingency evaporated quickly.
The Design & Reworks
When COVID hit, designers went home—literally. This added massive hurdles to evolving the design into something constructible. At the OMSF, the traction power substations (TPSS), and the guideway median, the civil work requirements are directly determined by the systems team (Hitachi), who faced their own delivery delays. This forced civil works to proceed at risk, leading to inevitable reworks.
Mistakes in trackwork design at intersections have resulted in the concrete busters you see on-site now. Between design errors and poor supervision, contractors were fired and several people were invited to quit.
The Utility Delay Reality
Standard phasing assumes utility relocation and road widening are finished before the median work starts. This requires coordination with Metrolinx, the Cities of Mississauga and Brampton (both of which are inexperienced with infrastructure mega-projects not managed directly by them), the MTO, and utility providers.
In this case, it failed everywhere. Utilities never moved at the pace they were supposed to due to a lack of commitment and extreme difficulty securing permits from the Cities and MTO—requirements that were unknown during the tender. To keep from stalling, we performed road widening before utilities moved. That’s why you see poles surrounded by asphalt today; it was a desperate mitigation strategy to allow our own utility work (storm, sanitary, watermain) to continue while third parties lagged.
Management & Self-Inflicted Wounds
While "delays by others" are real, we had plenty of self-inflicted wounds. Turnover has been incredibly high, from admin staff up to the Project Director and CEO. In a niche, competitive market, people are constantly being headhunted by mega-projects like the Ontario Line. Bringing in managers with zero Canadian experience sunk the project deeper. Furthermore, internal processes (or the lack thereof) and T&M contracts with partners meant there was often no real incentive for production.
Metrolinx & Accountability
For a long time, dealing with Metrolinx was like talking to a wall. Every call for help regarding permit hurdles or financial stress seemed to fall on deaf ears. However, as of late, there have been key changes in their top management. Since the previous CEO resigned and new leadership took over, the dynamic has shifted. While things seem to be improving, it will take time before these changes have a tangible impact on contractor performance and the final schedule.
As for the possibility of firing Mobilinx, it’s complicated—Webuild is already part of another consortium for the Ontario Line. It’s hard to imagine how Metrolinx could defend that from a PR perspective, not to mention the massive claims and lawsuits that would inevitably follow.
The Schedule
The latest recovery schedule targets a late 2028 completion. Based on the progress I see here and discussions with former colleagues, I don’t believe that is realistic. Between COVID, material shortages, labor strikes, and the factors described above, the timeline is under immense pressure.
I'll keep an eye on the thread and jump in if I can add any helpful context to the ongoing discussion.
